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While federal health reform sputters, states have begun to pursue their own 
transformative strategies for achieving universal coverage, the most ambitious of 
which are state-based single-payer plans. Since the passage of the Affordable Care 
Act in 2010, legislators in twenty-one states have proposed sixty-six unique bills to 
establish single-payer health care systems. This paper systematically surveys those 
state legislative efforts and exposes the federalism trap that threatens to derail them: 
ERISA’s preemption of state regulation relating to employer-sponsored health 
insurance. ERISA’s expansive preemption provision creates a narrow, risky path for 
state regulation to capture the employer health care expenditures crucial for financing 
a single-payer system. While this paper illustrates how state proposals may survive 
ERISA, the threat of preemption drives states to structure their plans in convoluted 
ways that may undermine other systemic goals such as universality, solidarity, and 
streamlined administration. 
This analysis demonstrates how ERISA’s uniquely broad preemption, coupled 
with its lack of waiver authority, elevates the interests of private employers above 
those of sovereign states and diminishes states’ abilities to serve as laboratories of 
health reform. We argue that this moment in health reform demands ERISA 
preemption reform. To restore balance to health care federalism and pave the way for 
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state reforms of all kinds, this paper proposes federal legislative and jurisprudential 
solutions: amendments to ERISA’s preemption provisions, the addition of a statutory 
waiver, and/or a reinterpretation of ERISA preemption consistent with congressional 
intent and the presumption against preemption. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marked a seismic shift in the U.S. health 
care system. It dramatically increased coverage, enlarged the federal role in 
the regulation of private health insurance, and altered the public’s 
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expectations and belief that everyone should have access to affordable 
coverage that does not discriminate on health status.1 Yet the ACA did not 
produce universal coverage, and as a federal settlement of health system 
regulation and design, it has proven unstable due to political and legal attacks 
undermining its effectiveness at health care coverage and cost control.2 Still, 
a feasible federal replacement for the ACA has proven elusive. 
Rather than wait idly by for federal progress, states have picked up the 
momentum on health reform, spurred both by necessity and an appetite for 
policy innovation. Of necessity, states have turned to their own reforms in 
response to federal governmental attempts to undermine the ACA’s coverage 
and cost-containment policies since the Trump Administration took power in 
2017.3 States also are testing different models and serving as laboratories for 
alternative ways to pay for health care, including some ambitious proposed 
experiments in single-payer plans. While federal single-payer reform under 
“Medicare-for-All”4 gains support and attention,5 state legislators quietly 
have drafted and introduced dozens of single-payer bills. 
This project surveys state efforts from 2010 through 2019 to establish 
single-payer health care, which we define as legislative attempts to achieve 
universal health care coverage for all residents in a state by combining 
 
1 See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, David A. Hyman & Peter D. Jacobson, The Affordable Care Act: 
Moving Forward in the Coming Years, 317 JAMA 19, 19-20 (2017); Timothy Jost, Taking Stock of Health 
Reform: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going, HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Dec. 6, 2016), 
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161206.057800/full/ [https://perma.cc/688V-HRVC]. 
2 See generally, e.g., John A. Graves & Sayeh S. Nikpay, The Changing Dynamics of US Health 
Insurance and Implications for the Future of the Affordable Care Act, 36 HEALTH AFF. 297 (2017); 
Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver Under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 213 (2019) 
[hereinafter McCuskey, Statutory Sabotage]; Jonathan Oberlander, The End of Obamacare, 376 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1 (2017); Sara Rosenbaum, The (Almost) Great Unraveling, 43 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y 
& L. 579 (2018). 
3 See Andrew B. Bindman, Marian R. Mulkey & Richard Kronick, Beyond the ACA: Paths to 
Universal Coverage in California, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1367, 1367 (2018) (“The passage of the ACA 
temporarily relieved states of the need to take the lead in expanding health care coverage. However, 
many states have returned to the issue in the wake of the threat by the administration of President 
Donald Trump to repeal the ACA.”). 
4 See Medicare for All, BERNIE SANDERS, http://web.archive.org/web/20190218074835/
https://berniesanders.com/medicareforall [https://perma.cc/T9JB-XQSP]. 
5 See, e.g., Nicole Gaudiano & Maureen Groppe, Democrats Back Medicare for All in About Half 
of House Races They’re Contesting, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/23/democrats-back-medicare-all-half-contested-house-
races/1732966002 [https://perma.cc/K6EM-FRAB]; Liz Hamel, Bryan Wu & Mollyann Brodie, Data 
Note: Modestly Strong but Malleable Support for Single-Payer Health Care, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. 
FOUND. (July 5, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/data-note-modestly-strong-
but-malleable-support-for-single-payer-health-care [https://perma.cc/3AT8-WYHP]; Public Opinion 
on Single Payer, National Health Plans, and Expanding Access to Medicare Coverage, HENRY J. KAISER 
FAM. FOUND. (July 30, 2019), https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-single-payer-
national-health-plans-and-expanding-access-to-medicare-coverage [https://perma.cc/M4PT-ZDQX]. 
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financing for all health care services into a single, state-administered payer.6 
State legislative proposals to establish single-payer plans have been 
surprisingly robust both in volume and variation, with sixty-six unique single-
payer bills introduced across twenty-one states since 2010.7 Though state 
single-payer proposals also face steep political, practical, legal, and financial 
challenges,8 the volume and detail of state bills suggest many of these are 
serious, nonsymbolic efforts. Our research particularly focuses on how these 
states seek to capture the employer-sponsored health insurance that currently 
covers forty-nine percent of Americans—a critical market for the solvency 
and viability of any single-payer plan.9 
Even if individual states can muster the political will and popular support 
to pass single-payer bills, a federalism trap threatens to thwart their 
transformative experiments: the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
of 1974 (ERISA),10 a federal statute governing employer-based benefit plans. 
When state laws conflict with federal ones, preemption doctrine generally 
displaces the state law in favor of the federal.11 But the express statement of 
preemption in ERISA sweeps even further, purporting to invalidate “any and 
all” state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan, not merely those 
which unavoidably conflict.12 
This indeterminately broad preemption language in ERISA, combined 
with an obscure “savings” clause for state regulation of insurers and an equally 
obscure “deemer” clause interpreted to prohibit states from regulating 
employer benefit arrangements that mimic insurance, has spawned 
 
6 Our methodology for identifying state single-payer bills is set forth in Section I.A. and 
Appendix B, infra. 
7 See infra Section I.A. 
8 A full discussion of these other challenges is beyond the scope of this Article. The most 
significant of these include: (a) the difficulty and necessity of securing waivers from the federal 
government to include Medicare, Medicaid, and Affordable Care Act marketplaces in the single-
payer plan; (b) the need for states to raise taxes significantly to make up for the massive federal 
subsidy of employer-based health plans through the preferred tax treatment of these plans, which 
would be lost if these plans are shifted to the state single-payer plan; and (c) the fact that states, 
unlike the federal government, cannot deficit-spend and thus would struggle to finance single-payer 
programs in a recession when revenues decline. See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of 
Obamacare, 127 YALE L.J.F. 1 (2017); Lindsay Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health 
Care, 79 OHIO ST. L.J. 843 (2018). 
9 Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/total-population/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B
%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D [https://perma.cc/F2N4-U4MP] (use 
“Refine Results” menu to select the timeframe 2017) [hereinafter Health Insurance Coverage]. 
10 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2018). 
11 See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 n.3 (2000). 
12 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018).   
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voluminous litigation and derailed state health reforms for decades.13 States, 
for example, may not impose their own “employer mandates” to provide 
health benefits due to ERISA preemption; they therefore mostly had to wait 
for federal legislation (the ACA) to impose them. As another example, state 
laws establishing mandatory minimum health benefits “relate to” employer-
provided health benefits; the “savings” clause avoids preemption when states 
enforce these minimum benefits laws against insurance companies selling 
insurance to employers, yet the “deemer” clause preempts their application 
to employers who self-insure their own health benefits.14 ERISA preemption 
thus raises a daunting legal challenge and uncertainty for states trying to 
capture critical employer-based health spending and draw those with 
employer-based coverage into the single-payer system. 
States are tying themselves in knots to avoid ERISA preemption in their 
health reforms. The state single-payer bills we studied feature several 
innovations to accomplish indirectly what ERISA prohibits them from doing 
directly, namely to mandate that employers participate in and cover all their 
employees through the state’s single-payer plan.15 State single-payer bills 
contain at least three types of provisions to capture employer health 
expenditures and move enrollees into the system: (A) funding plans that use 
payroll taxes, income taxes, or both to raise revenue to pay for the single-
payer plan and to encourage employers and employees to shift from 
employer-based coverage to the state single-payer plan;16 (B) provider 
regulations that restrict participating providers from billing any third party 
other than the single-payer plan at single-payer rates;17 and (C) 
assignment/subrogation/secondary-payer provisions that allow the single-
payer plan to pay for services for enrollees with dual coverage, and then seek 
reimbursement from the collateral source of coverage.18 
This Article comprehensively catalogues state single-payer proposals and 
analyzes whether ERISA would preempt state efforts to capture the employer 
expenditures. There are strong arguments why each of these three types of 
provisions (A–Funding Plan; B–Provider Restriction; or C–Assignment/
Subrogation/Secondary-Payer) should survive ERISA preemption. But 
courts’ unpredictable, tortured, and at times contradictory application of 
 
13 See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and 
Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88, 89-90 (2009). 
14 Id. at 90. 
15 A state mandate that employers must provide health benefits to employees or, if the 
employer opts to provide benefits, cover employees under the state’s single-payer plan would be 
preempted by ERISA because such a mandate would “relate to” an employee benefit plan, altering 
the structure of the employer’s plan. See infra note 114. 
16 See infra subsection I.B.1. 
17 See infra subsection I.B.2. 
18 See infra subsection I.B.3. 
394 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 389 
ERISA casts a pall of uncertainty over their durability and invites litigation.19 
Legal uncertainty amplifies the political challenges of establishing a state 
single-payer system because policymakers may struggle to pass such a 
sweeping legislative reform if key parts may be preempted.20 ERISA 
preemption targets the primary funding provisions in these bills, further 
threatening the economic modeling and revenue stream upon which single-
payer plans depend. Legal uncertainty over ERISA preemption thus narrows 
the eye of the political and economic needle a state must thread to establish 
single-payer health care. 
ERISA is also an interloper in federal health insurance regulation—an 
employee-benefits statute not originally intended to govern health care, but 
which now exerts a powerful influence over it. Unlike most major federal 
health care statutes including Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA, ERISA 
does not provide for waiver, state experimentation, or federal funding.21 The 
Department of Labor, which administers ERISA, lacks the statutory authority 
to waive its preemption, even if the Department finds it would be beneficial.22 
Nor will the agency’s enforcement discretion save a state’s single-payer 
provision from preemption because employers or third-party administrators 
can raise ERISA preemption through litigation, enforced by courts. 
The combined effect of ERISA’s extremely broad preemption provision 
and its lack of a waiver thwarts all manner of state autonomy and flexibility 
in health reform. ERISA’s obstruction stands at odds with other federal 
statutes that distribute authority and control between the national and state 
governments to allow state flexibility against a backdrop of federal standards 
and agency expertise in health care regulation. 
 
19 See infra subsection II.A.2. 
20 See Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1783 (2011) (“A 
state has a greater incentive to confirm the preferences of its own citizens or serve as a ‘laboratory 
of benefits’ if its regulatory decisions will not be reduced into nothingness by ERISA preemption.”). 
21 Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur & Health Reform Preemption, 78 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1099, 1102-03 (2017) [hereinafter McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur]; infra text accompanying notes 338–
342; cf. Karl Polzer & Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA, 16 HEALTH 
AFF. 93, 93-94 (1997) (explaining that “ERISA was designed to establish uniform federal standards,” 
but has the effect of “substantially deregulat[ing] employee health plans” due in part to its “lack of 
substantive requirements in the health area”). Other federal programs like the Veterans 
Administration, TRICARE (which covers active military members and their dependents), and 
federal employee health benefits, as well as statutes that exert profound but indirect influence on 
health insurance, like the Internal Revenue Code, do not have waivers, either. 
22 See infra subsection III.B.2 and text accompanying notes 338–342; see also MANATT HEALTH 
& CALIF. HEALTH CARE FOUNDATION, UNDERSTANDING THE RULES: FEDERAL LEGAL 
CONSIDERATIONS FOR STATE-BASED APPROACHES TO EXPAND COVERAGE IN CALIFORNIA 5, 
10 (2018) (noting that ERISA’s “provisions are not waivable by administrative action” and that states 
seeking suspension of the statutory preemption “would likely need federal legislation to receive an 
exemption”). 
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ERISA’s broad preemption springs from a concern in 1974 that multistate 
employers would refuse to provide health benefits to their employees if 
subjected to state regulatory variations.23 The conditions underlying this 
assumption, however, have shifted since the ACA significantly supplanted 
state health insurance regulation with federal standards and imposed a federal 
mandate for larger employers to offer health coverage.24 While multistate 
employers’ need for regulatory uniformity to continue offering coverage 
arguably has receded,25 ERISA’s continued insistence on national uniformity 
prevents states from effectuating major health system reforms that their 
citizens desire and still leaves self-funded employer plans largely unregulated. 
The breadth of ERISA preemption thus elevates the interests of private 
businesses above the interests and police powers of sovereign states. 
In this Article, we do not argue that any state ought to establish single-
payer health care or that state-based single-payer health care is preferable to 
a national effort or to other, more incremental reforms toward universal 
coverage and cost control.26 Instead, our research reveals that even if a state’s 
citizens want single-payer, the state faces a nearly insurmountable structural 
challenge from ERISA. Because ERISA thwarts state experimentation with 
single-payer models, it also denies an opportunity to gather evidence on 
whether single-payer systems have advantages or disadvantages over other 
reforms. State single-payer legislation provides a stark illustration of the 
federalism trap created by ERISA that has stymied states’ health reform 
efforts—big and small—for decades. 
We propose four solutions to clear the way for state health reforms and 
reduce ERISA’s obstruction—three legislative and one jurisprudential. First, 
Congress could amend ERISA’s preemption provisions with respect to health 
benefit plans, replacing its broad “any and all” preemption with “floor 
preemption,” used in other federal health care statutes. Floor preemption, 
which displaces only those state laws that are less stringent than the federal 
 
23 Phyllis C. Borzi, There’s “Private” and Then There’s “Private”: ERISA, Its Impact, and Options 
for Reform, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 660, 663 (2008). 
24 See 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) (containing the employer mandate); id. § 9815 (applying 
many of the ACA’s health insurance requirements, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg et seq. (2018), to 
group health plans governed by ERISA); 29 U.S.C. § 1185d (2018) (same). 
25 See, e.g., Mallory Jensen, Is ERISA Preemption Superfluous in the New Age of Health Care 
Reform?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 464, 516 (noting that “[i]n the [ACA’s] implementation period, 
ERISA preemption will no longer have the same relevance for health law that it once did,” in part 
because “many of the ACA’s reforms will happen at a federal level”). 
26 Observers have considered the merits of a variety of approaches to health care reform. See, 
e.g., Katie Gudiksen, Single-Payer vs. Public Option: Can Either System Address Rising Health Care 
Prices?, THE SOURCE ON HEALTHCARE PRICE & COMPETITION: THE SOURCE BLOG (Mar. 29, 
2018), http://sourceonhealthcare.org/single-payer-vs-public-option-can-either-system-address-
rising-health-care-prices [https://perma.cc/N8RZ-EATX]. 
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standard (the “floor”), preserves uniformity in federal baseline regulations, 
balanced with state flexibility to enact laws consistent with and no less 
protective than the federal floor. Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s 
“deemer clause”27 for health benefits to correct Supreme Court interpretation 
that has built an impenetrable barrier of preemption around self-funded 
employer-based plans. Third, Congress could instead add a statutory waiver 
provision to ERISA, which would allow states to ask the federal government 
to suspend ERISA preemption for their proposed health reforms. As seen in 
other federal health care statutes, an ERISA waiver would allow the federal 
government to manage the degrees of uniformity and variation, while still 
permitting state experimentation in health policy. Floor preemption and 
deemer clause revisions to ERISA would produce the most direct and 
enduring reforms, but a waiver provision might offer the most politically 
expedient option, though far more limited in its effect. 
Fourth, because the scope of ERISA preemption depends largely on 
jurisprudential interpretation of the statute, courts could curtail the scope of 
ERISA preemption and reinvigorate the “presumption against preemption” 
for health care regulation in a way that more accurately reflects Congress’s 
original legislative intent for ERISA.28 While we recognize this as a potential 
avenue for ERISA reform, we have little faith in its efficacy because of its 
fragmentary implementation and because the courts who broke ERISA 
interpretation are unlikely to effectuate its repair. If neither Congress nor the 
courts will address ERISA’s obstruction, we recommend ways state legislators 
may build an ERISA-resistant single-payer plan using overlapping provisions 
to protect the system’s viability in the event a court finds any single provision 
preempted.29 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the findings of a 
survey of state single-payer bills introduced from 2010 through 2019 and their 
key features, identifying three types of provisions that state single-payer 
proposals use to capture employer health expenditures and the forty-nine 
percent of Americans covered by employer plans: Type A (Funding Plan), 
Type B (Provider Restrictions), and Type C (Assignment/Subrogation/
Secondary-Payer) provisions. Part II details the application of ERISA 
preemption analysis to each of these provisions and the degree to which each 
 
27 ERISA’s broad preemption provision contains an exception, the “savings clause,” which saves 
from preemption state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2018). But the savings clause 
contains a further exception, the “deemer clause,” which has been interpreted by courts to deem 
self-funded group health plans as not in the business of insurance, and therefore not subject to 
state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (2018); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 
471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). 
28 See infra Section III.B. 
29 See infra Section II.C. 
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should survive ERISA preemption. Part III then situates ERISA in the 
broader context of federal health insurance statutes. Although Congress did 
not intend ERISA to be a health care statute, ERISA’s extraordinarily broad 
preemption, scant federal regulation, and lack of waiver flexibility create a 
federalism trap, obstructing state experimentation and autonomy in ways that 
undermine the health care federalism infrastructure of the ACA, Medicaid, 
and Medicare statutes. We offer four proposals to remove ERISA’s 
obstructions to state health reform, infusing the federal regulatory scheme 
with greater flexibility and recalibrating its role in health care federalism. 
Ultimately, we urge that the time has come to amend ERISA preemption in 
order to unshackle meaningful state health reforms from its outdated prohibitions. 
I. STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS 
State health reform momentum has only picked up steam after the ACA. 
State reform efforts range from patches for the individual market,30 laws 
targeting surprise medical bills31 and prescription drug prices,32 proposals to 
allow any state resident to buy a public plan, such as Medicaid,33 all the way 
to full transformation of the health care finance system in state single-payer 
proposals. This Part takes a deep dive into the ambitious end of state health 
reforms: state single-payer plans. 
A. The Recent Proliferation of State Single-Payer Proposals 
The volume of state interest and activity in single-payer health care, as 
measured by proposed legislation, has been substantial. Since the ACA was 
passed in 2010 through 2019, legislators in twenty-one states have proposed 
sixty-six unique single-payer bills.34 Although our research turned up over 
100 bills that can be characterized as proposing a state-based single-payer 
plan, removal of duplicates (i.e., substantially similar bills introduced in 
 
30 See Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (July 31, 
2019), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-state-innovation-waivers 
[https://perma.cc/EQ99-FHWZ]. 
31 See Christina Cousart, State Legislators Take Action to Protect Consumers from Surprise Billing, 
NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y (Sept. 18, 2018), https://nashp.org/state-legislators-take-
action-to-protect-consumers-from-surprise-billing [https://perma.cc/8MWM-UJL5]. 
32 See Robert Pear, States Rush to Rein In Prescription Costs, and Drug Companies Fight Back, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/us/politics/states-drug-costs.html 
[https://perma.cc/8E2W-4WXY]. 
33 See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Can States Fix the Disaster of American Health Care?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/opinion/california-states-health-care.html 
[https://perma.cc/N8PD-8YR6]. 
34 See infra Appendix A for a table listing all the bills by state and year, and infra Appendix B 
for search terms and methodology for identifying state single-payer proposals. 
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different chambers in the same legislative session or bills assigned different 
numbers as they move through the legislative process) resulted in sixty-six 
bills. Although many bills explicitly stated that their purpose was to establish 
a single-payer health system, not all did.35 We characterized bills as state 
single-payer proposals if they sought to establish universal health care 
coverage for all residents in a state by combining financing for all health care 
services into a single, state-administered payer. We excluded bills that did not 
meet this definition and thus did not purport to establish a single-payer plan, 
such as those that called for a study of single-payer, expressed support for a 
national single-payer plan, or attempted less-than-comprehensive health care 
reforms (for example, universal primary care).36 None except Vermont’s ill-
fated single-payer plan37 was passed, and no state has implemented a single-
payer system. 
The defining characteristics of state single-payer proposals are the 
combination of universal eligibility for state residents38 and reliance on 
statutory waivers from Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA to consolidate these 
sources of federal funding and their covered populations into the state single-
payer plan.39 Other common elements include: expansive provider 
eligibility;40 administratively set or negotiated rates for providers and health 
 
35 Compare H.D. 1516, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. § 1 (Md. 2018) (“It is the intent of the General 
Assembly that: (1) There be a comprehensive universal single-payer health care coverage program 
and a health care cost control system for the benefit of all residents of the State.”), with H.R. 2436, 
100th Leg., 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017) (providing, in synopsis, “that all individuals residing in 
the State are covered under the Illinois Health Services Program for health insurance”). 
36 See infra Appendix B for search terms and exclusion criteria. 
37 See Act of May 26, 2011, 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 239 (enacting H.R. 202, providing for 
universal coverage in Vermont); John E. McDonough, The Demise of Vermont’s Single-Payer Plan, 372 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1584, 1584 (2015) (identifying reasons that the plan’s implementation was 
“abandoned”). 
38 See, e.g., S. 562, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2017) (§ 100620(a)) (“Every resident of 
the state shall be eligible and entitled to enroll as a member under the program.”); H.R. 440, 132d 
Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ohio 2017) (§ 3920.07(A)) (“All Ohio residents and individuals employed in 
Ohio, including the homeless and migrant workers, are eligible for coverage under the Ohio health 
care plan.”); cf. id. (§ 3920.07(F) & (G)) (extending eligibility to nonresidents who work in the state 
or college students who attend university in the state). 
39 Waiver reliance to include federal payers is nearly universal among the single-payer plans. 
See, e.g., S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018) (§ 23-95-12(d)) (providing that “[t]he director 
shall seek and obtain waivers and other approvals relating to Medicaid, the Children’s Health 
Insurance Program, Medicare, the ACA, and any other relevant federal programs” to preserve and 
maximize federal funds available, while moving them into the state single-payer fund). Further, most 
state single-payer proposals would require a waiver from the U.S. Department of Health & Human 
Services of the Affordable Care Act’s employer mandate, pursuant to the ACA’s Section 1332 waiver 
provision. Wiley, supra note 8, at 863-64, 878. 
40 See, e.g., S. 1872, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 11 (Fla. 2018) (“Any health care provider who is 
licensed to practice in this state and is otherwise in good standing is qualified to participate in the 
program as long as the health care provider’s services are performed within this state.”). 
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care goods, such as prescription drugs;41 low or no cost-sharing for patients;42 
comprehensive coverage of services;43 and mechanisms for care coordination.44 
The volume, variation, and detail of these state single-payer proposals is 
surprising. Although many of the states with single-payer proposals are 
controlled by Democrats, the single-payer bills are not exclusively from 
“blue” states. Most of the states with single-payer proposals expanded 
Medicaid under the ACA, so only a small fraction of their populations remain 
uninsured. So, there seems to be something else beyond universal coverage 
driving many of these single-payer bills. That something else appears to be 
an effort to control health care costs through expansive rate-setting authority 
for health care services and prescription drugs,45 a reduction of administrative 
costs for the state and the health care industry by streamlining the multi-
payer system into one,46 and relieving citizens of their growing cost-sharing 
burdens from high deductibles, out-of-network bills, and co-insurance rates.47 
Figure 1 depicts the twenty-one states with at least one single-payer bill 
proposed between 2010 and 2019.  
 
41 See, e.g., A. 4738-A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (N.Y. 2018) (§ 4). Provider rates are commonly 
set through negotiation representatives of providers and the single-payer plan, along with 
formularies and negotiated prices for prescription drugs. 
42 See, e.g., S. 1014, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 503(c) (Pa. 2018) (“Participants are 
not subject to copayments, deductibles, point-of-service charges or any other fee or charge for a 
service within the package and shall not be directly billed nor balance billed by participating 
providers for covered benefits provided to the participant.”). 
43 See, e.g., S. 5957, 65th Leg., 2d Spec. Sess. § 16 (Wash. 2017). The bills include, and go 
beyond, the ACA’s essential health benefits, and typically include services covered by Medicare and 
Medicaid. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1) (2018) (defining the ten “essential health benefits” that 
must be covered by nongroup health plans), with S. 219, 90th Leg., Reg. Sess. art. 3, § 1(2) (Minn. 
2017) (defining thirty-one covered health benefits, including skilled nursing facilities and long-term 
supportive services currently covered under the state’s Medicaid program). 
44 See, e.g., H. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 16 (Iowa 2018). Some require eligible 
beneficiaries to enroll in a care coordinator, which can be their primary care physician, a “medical 
home,” or an organization, such as an ACO or HMO. See id. § 2 (defining “care coordinator”); id. 
§ 16 (providing requirements for care coordination). 
45 See, e.g., A. 5248, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y. 2019) (“To address the fiscal crisis facing 
the health care system and the state and to assure New Yorkers can exercise their right to health 
care, affordable and comprehensive health coverage must be provided.”); S. 786, 121st Gen. Assemb., 
1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2015) (providing for the authority to establish rates for both health care 
providers that participate in the state program and those that do not). 
46 See, e.g., H. 2987, 190th Gen. Ct., 1st Reg. Sess. § 1(b) (Mass. 2017) (“Today’s numerous 
private and public health insurance plans, with differing benefits and patient payment requirements, 
impose massive administrative burdens on doctors, hospitals, other health care organizations, as well 
as on patients, employers and other payers. Purchasing power is fragmented.”). 
47 See, e.g., S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018) (§ 23-95-1(e)) (stating in its Legislative 
Findings that “Rhode Island must act because there are currently no effective state or federal laws 
that can adequately control rising premiums, co-pays, deductibles and medical costs, or prevent 
private insurance companies from continuing to limit available providers and coverage.”). 
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Figure 1: States with Single Payer Bills, by Medicaid Expansion Status 
 
Although many, if not most, of these bills are political long-shots in their 
state legislatures, collectively they do not appear to be purely symbolic or 
precatory.48 Many of the single-payer proposals are highly detailed, seemingly 
the products of a great deal of thought, analysis, political tradeoffs, and 
resources.49 The impression of viewing these state single-payer bills in 
totality is that there is a nontrivial possibility that some state or states could 
 
48 Of course, some bills may be totally symbolic or just manifest one legislator’s policy position, 
while others have more support from multiple co-sponsors or coalitions and have advanced further 
along the legislative process. We did not assess the bills for their “seriousness” in terms of breadth 
of political support. 
49 For example, some states have held hearings or have benefitted from in-depth economic 
assessments of their single-payer plans, demonstrating both the specificity of proposals and a 
commitment of significant resources to understand their economic impact. See, e.g., ANDREW 
BINDMAN, MARIAN MULKEY & RICHARD KRONICK, A PATH TO UNIVERSAL COVERAGE AND 
UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN CALIFORNIA (2018), https://healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/
sites/healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/files/Report%20Final%203_13_18.pdf [https://perma.cc/XYK4-
WB26]; JODI LIU ET AL., RAND CORP., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW YORK HEALTH ACT: A 
SINGLE-PAYER OPTION FOR NEW YORK STATE (2018), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_
reports/RR2424.html [https://perma.cc/995S-EWK5]; JOHN SHEILS & MEGAN COLE, 
LEWIN GRP., COST AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE-PAYER PLAN IN 
MINNESOTA (2012), https://growthandjustice.org/images/uploads/LEWIN.Final_Report_
FINAL_DRAFT.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZM39-TFUM]; CHAPIN WHITE ET AL., RAND 
CORPORATION, A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF FOUR OPTIONS FOR FINANCING 
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN OREGON (2017), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/
RR1662.html [https://perma.cc/L8M2-HQLV]. 
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thread the political, administrative, financial, and legal needles necessary to 
pass a single-payer plan in the coming years. 
B. How State Single-Payer Plans Capture Employer Health Expenditures 
The billion-dollar question, both in terms of dollars at stake and legal 
hurdles from ERISA, is how the state single-payer plan addresses employer-
sponsored health coverage.50 In the U.S., forty-nine percent of the population 
is covered by employer-sponsored coverage, which amounts to twenty percent 
of our total national health care expenditures.51 Once the single-payer system 
starts covering this population, it must capture the vast employer and 
employee expenditures that pay for such coverage.52 State legislation faces a 
big obstacle in achieving this critical task: ERISA preempts state law that 
“relates to” employer-sponsored benefits, as detailed in Part II below. 
Additionally, the population covered by employer-sponsored health benefits 
tends to be healthier than those covered by public programs, which is critical 
to balancing the risk pool for the single-payer plan.53 Of those with employer-
based coverage, more than sixty percent are covered by self-funded plans (also 
called self-insured plans), where the employer pays for the health benefits 
with its own funds, retaining financial or insurance risk.54 As discussed in Part 
 
50 The other critical question is whether the federal Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) will grant states waivers to capture federal Medicaid (1115 waiver), Medicare 
(demonstration waivers), and ACA (1332 waiver) funds for the states’ single-payer plans. These 
statutory waivers lie beyond the scope of this Article, but other scholars have provided analysis. See, 
e.g., Wiley, supra note 8. 
51 Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 9; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2017 HIGHLIGHTS 2, https://www.cms.gov/Research-
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
downloads/highlights.pdf [https://perma.cc/SX4S-6BQM] (last visited Nov. 20, 2019). 
52 In addition to these direct expenditures, the federal government further subsidizes employer 
spending on health benefits by not taxing such expenditure as wages. See generally Employee Benefits, 
U.S. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-
businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits [https://perma.cc/UC5E-BZJJ]. Although policy 
debates on the tax treatment of employee health benefits is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
larger point is that capturing what the system currently spends on employer health expenditures is 
critical for the financial viability of any single-payer plan. 
53  Brief of Harvard Law School Center for Health Law & Policy Innovation, et al. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 19-20, Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) 
(No. 14-181), 2015 WL 5261549, at *19-20; Victor R. Fuchs, How to Make US Health Care More 
Equitable and Less Costly: Begin By Replacing Employment-Based Insurance, 320 JAMA 2071, 2071 (2018). 
54 GARY CLAXTON ET AL., HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., 2018 EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS SURVEY 167 (2018), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-
benefits-survey/167 [https://perma.cc/YN5Q-5KVJ]; see also CIGNA HEALTH & LIFE INS. CO., 
ADVANTAGES AND MYTHS OF SELF-FUNDING FOR EMPLOYERS WITH FEWER THAN 250 
EMPLOYEES 2 (2014), http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/business/small-employers/841956_b_self_
funding_whitepaper_v8.pdf [https://perma.cc/YSW7-LNPJ] (“Traditional self-funding is defined 
as when an employer pays for their own medical claims directly, while a third-party administrator 
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II, ERISA’s “deemer” clause has placed self-funded plans entirely beyond the 
reach of state regulation.55 
To assess the distorting effect of ERISA preemption on states’ health 
reform efforts, this project focuses on analyzing how states can capture 
employers’ expenditures and transition the forty-nine percent of the 
population covered by employer-sponsored health plans into the state single-
payer program.56 We reviewed the sixty-six single-payer bills to identify their 
methods of capturing employer expenditures, as discussed below.57 Eight of 
the sixty-six proposals purported to establish a single-payer program for the 
state, but did not contain an explicit mechanism to capture employer 
expenditures or move those with employer coverage into the single–payer 
program, for example by creating a state-based “Medicare-for-All” program, 
enrolling everyone in the state in an expanded version of Medicare.58 Thus, 
we focused our analysis on the remaining fifty-eight state single-payer 
proposals for their methods of capturing employer expenditures and moving 
those covered by employee health plans into the single-payer program. 
Due to ERISA preemption, discussed in Part II, states cannot simply 
mandate that employers adopt the single-payer plan as their employee health 
plan. However, states must capture employers’ expenditures and shift those 
covered by employer-based health plans into the single-payer system, or else 
its single-payer plan is not truly a single-payer plan, and the economics will 
not work. 
Unable to mandate that self-funded employers drop their benefit plans 
and participate in the single-payer plan under ERISA, state single-payer 
proposals mix and match the following tools to capture employer 
expenditures: (A) imposing a payroll tax on employers, an income tax on 
individuals, or both to fund the single-payer plan; (B) requiring or creating 
incentives for all provider payments to be made through the single payer 
entity at single-payer rates; and (C) subrogation, assignment, or secondary-
payer provisions allowing the single-payer entity to pay for services and seek 
reimbursement from employer plans or other collateral sources. 
In addition, most proposals contain nonduplication provisions prohibiting 
insurers from offering health benefits that duplicate those covered by the 
 
administers the health plan by processing the claims, issuing ID cards, handling customer questions 
and performing other tasks.”). 
55 See infra Section II.A. 
56 Health Insurance Coverage, supra note 9. 
57 See infra Section I.B. 
58 See, e.g., S. 2598, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018) (purporting to provide all New Jersey 
residents with federal Medicare coverage). 
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single-payer plan.59 The idea behind nonduplication is that if insurers cannot 
sell plans that cover any of the services or benefits covered by the single-payer 
plan, then there are no competing private plans to choose from. Insurers may 
only sell so-called wraparound services that supplement the single-payer 
coverage. On its face, a nonduplication provision appears to do much of the 
work of shifting those with employer-based coverage to the single-payer plan, 
because employers would not have any health plan options to offer their 
employees in the single-payer state. However, as discussed in Part II, ERISA 
preemption likely would make the nonduplication provisions unenforceable 
against self-funded employer-based health plans.60 Thus, state single-payer 
proposals must use other provisions to draw the self-funded employers’ 
expenditures and their enrollees into the single-payer plan. 
Appendix A contains a list of the single-payer bills proposed between 2010 
and 2019 and their mechanisms to capture employer-sponsored health 
spending. Appendix B details our methodology for collecting and analyzing 
these state single-payer bills. 
1. Type A—Funding Plan 
The Type A—Funding Plan model captures employer expenditures and 
participation through a payroll tax, an individual income tax, or both. Payroll 
taxes are levied on employers and are calculated as a percentage of the wages 
that an employer pays its employees.61 The fact that the payroll tax is based 
on wages and not the employer’s spending on employee health benefits is 
significant for the ERISA preemption analysis below.62 As tallied in Table 2, 
forty-five bills across sixteen states contain a Type-A funding plan.63 State 
proposals may impose a flat64 or graduated payroll tax rate,65 which also may 
 
59 See, e.g., H. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 7(3) (Iowa 2017) (“An insurer, carrier, or 
health maintenance organization that is issued a certificate of authority by the commissioner of 
insurance may offer only the following: . . . Benefits that do not duplicate the health care services 
covered by the healthy Iowa program.”). 
60 See infra subsection II.B.4. 
61 Cf. John A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 110, 110 
(1971) (noting that while payroll taxes may be imposed on the employer, some economists believe 
that they are typically paid by the employee in the form of reduced wages). 
62 See infra subsection II.B.1. 
63 See infra Table 2. 
64 See, e.g., S. 1014, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 904(a) (Pa. 2018) (“[A] tax of 10% is 
imposed on payroll amounts generated as a result of an employer conducting business activity 
within this Commonwealth.”). Vermont’s plan would have imposed a flat 11.5% payroll tax as well as 
a graduated income tax. See STATE OF VERMONT, GREEN MOUNTAIN CARE: A 
COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR BUILDING VERMONT’S UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 5 (2014), 
http://hcr.vermont.gov/ sites/hcr/files/pdfs/GMC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20123014.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4QTX-AR2C]. 
65 See A. 4738-A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 4(2)(a) (N.Y. 2018); LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2. 
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apply to self-employed income.66 Some states divide the payroll tax among 
employers and employees, with the employer paying a larger proportion of 
the tax, similar to the current division of premiums for employer-based 
coverage.67 Other states would impose an income tax on employees to capture 
the employee share of spending on health coverage.68 Income taxes may apply 
to unearned income to capture non-wage earnings, such as interest, capital 
gains, or dividends,69 and can be progressively scaled to income levels. Sales 
and excise taxes are possible, but potentially more regressive than taxes scaled 
to individual income. 
A payroll tax would lead many employers to drop their own coverage if 
they must pay the tax regardless of whether they offer their own employer-
based plan.70 The individual share of a payroll tax or an income tax is a way 
to replicate the employee’s contribution to health care premiums and capture 
unearned income and income of state residents who are employed by out-of-
state employers. If employees are required to pay a tax to fund the state 
single-payer program, many will elect to drop their employer-based plans so 
as to avoid double-paying for redundant coverage.71 
The simplest form of Type A plan would rely solely on a payroll tax and/or 
income tax to capture employer expenditures and move enrollees to drop 
their employer coverage. These “Funding Only” proposals capture 
employers’ health care expenditures directly via a payroll tax and assume that 
few employers would continue to offer their own coverage for employees 
subject to the payroll tax assessment, and even if they do, few employees will 
 
66 See S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018). 
67 See id.; LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 14. The New York Health Act (NYHA) would divide 
the payroll tax, such that employers pay 80 percent, and employees pays 20 percent. 
68 See STATE OF VERMONT, supra note 64, at 5 (“[T]he highest-income Vermonters would pay 
9.5 percent of income through a public premium, up to a maximum of $27,500, while lower-income 
Vermonters would pay based on a sliding scale tied to a lower percentage of income ranging from 0 
up to 9.5 percent.”). 
69 See S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018) (§ 23-95-12(j)) (“There shall be a 
progressive contribution based on unearned income, i.e., capital gains, dividends, interest, profits, 
and rents. Initially, the unearned income RICHIP contributions shall be equal to ten percent (10%) 
of such unearned income.”); see also LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2 (“Individuals would not pay 
premiums for [the New York Health program, or] NYH. Instead, the program would be financed 
by new graduated state taxes on payroll and nonpayroll income (such as interest, dividends, and 
capital gains) and redirected federal funding through waivers and state funding for current health 
care programs.”). 
70 See LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2, 50 (explaining that “[w]hile the NYHA does not prohibit 
employers from offering health insurance, it does include a mandatory employer payroll tax 
contribution to help fund NYH,” and noting the assumption that the payroll tax will replace 
employer spending on employer-sponsored insurance, with overall employer spending on health 
care unchanged). 
71 As discussed in Part II, a funding plan based on a payroll tax should avoid preemption by 
ERISA, but it is far from certain whether courts will agree. Income taxes generally would not 
implicate ERISA. See infra subsection II.A.2. 
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continue to take up employer coverage once they are covered by the state 
single-payer plan. An example of a Funding Only model is Washington’s 2017 
single-payer bill, which would fund its single-payer plan using a payroll tax 
for employers, with no exceptions.72 Most of the state single-payer bills that 
contain a funding plan combine the financing mechanism with other tools, 
discussed below, to entice individuals into the single-payer plan and capture 
employer health expenditures. 
The Type A—Funding Plan can be analogized to public school financing. 
All households must pay property taxes to fund public schools that all 
children are eligible to attend.73 If certain households wish to pay for private 
school, they are free to do so, but it does not excuse them from their property 
tax. The public school analogy also reveals a nuance of the Funding Plan 
approach: unless the quality or choice of providers is the same or superior in 
the single-payer plan, there may be employers and employees who continue 
to maintain their employer-based plans, even when subject to the taxes to 
fund the single-payer plan. 
2. Type B—Provider Restriction 
A second variation, the Type B—Provider Restriction model, uses a form 
of provider regulation to draw individuals away from employer-based plans 
into the single-payer plan. Thirty-four of the single-payer bills across 
fourteen states contain a Type-B provider restriction.74 Because provider 
regulation tends to fall beyond the reach of ERISA preemption,75 state single-
payer proposals use provider regulation to move individuals to drop their 
employer coverage. These provisions restrict participating providers from 
billing anyone other than the single-payer plan, whether the patient or any 
third-party payer, for services rendered to a patient with single-payer 
coverage. In addition, the provisions limit providers’ payment rates to the 
single-payer rates. For example, California’s S. 562 says that participating 
providers may not “charge any rate in excess of the payment established under 
this title for any health care service provided to a member under the program 
and shall not solicit or accept payment from any member or third party for any health 
care service, except as provided under a federal program.”76 The proposals may 
 
72 S. 5747, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 16-17 (Wash. 2017). 
73 See STATE OF VERMONT, supra note 64, at 11 (explaining the analogous relationship between 
public school financing and the Vermont single-payer plan, Green Mountain Care). 
74 See infra Table 2. 
75 See infra Section II.A. 
76 S. 562, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2017) (§ 100639(e)(2)) (emphasis added). The 
proposed statute further states that “[t]his section does not preclude the program from acting as a 
primary or secondary payer in conjunction with another third-party payer when permitted by a 
federal program.” Id. In other words, for programs like TRICARE and the federal employee health 
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automatically enroll all residents in the state single-payer plan, or they may 
deem all residents presumptively eligible, but require an affirmative step to 
enroll.77 Under either model, most plans assume all residents would be 
covered by the single-payer plan. 
The Provider Restriction model creates incentives for patients to drop 
their employer-based coverage because if providers want to participate in the 
single-payer plan, they are barred from billing employer-based plans and 
would thus cease participating in those plans. If providers are unable to be 
paid from any other source, they will no longer see patients who have other 
coverage. The limitation on providers’ charges to the single-payer rate also 
reduces incentives to continue to participate in other plan networks, such as 
employer-based plans, because they will not be able to earn more from those 
payers than from the single payer. Thus, the provider networks for the 
employer plans would shrink considerably, perhaps to the point where 
employer-based coverage is all but worthless to employees. Employees will 
drop employer coverage if it lacks a functioning provider network. 
In some instances, we characterized single-payer proposals as Type B 
models even when they lacked an explicit limit on providers’ ability to be paid 
from non-single payer sources. For example, a plan could be characterized as 
containing a Provider Restriction where it contained strong incentives for 
providers to participate exclusively in the program short of a mandate to do 
so, such as requirements that providers participate on an all-or-nothing basis78 
or onerous notification requirements.79 Another example is South Carolina’s 
bill, which would allow providers to be reimbursed at a higher rate if they 
participate in the single-payer plan’s network than if they do not.80 
 
benefits programs, which do not provide waivers, presumably the provider would be permitted to 
bill these federal programs directly, and the state single payer could be the secondary payer. 
77 Compare S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018) (§ 23-95-5(a)(1)) (requiring the plan 
director to “identify [and] automatically enroll . . . qualified Rhode Island residents”), and H.R. 74, 
147th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1611 (Del. 2013) (declaring “[a]ll Delaware citizens” entitled to 
benefits but establishing no enrollment procedure), with H.R. 1793, 165th Gen. Ct., 2d Sess. § 2 
(N.H. 2018) (§ 404-J:4) (extending presumptive eligibility to “[a]ll individuals legally residing in 
New Hampshire” but requiring completion of an application for payment of benefits). 
78 See, e.g., H. 2436, 100th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 40(g) (Ill. 2017) (“Providers who accept payment 
from the Program for services rendered may not bill any patient for covered services. Providers may 
elect either to participate fully, or not at all, in the Program.”); see also S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 3 (R.I. 2018) (§§ 23-95-7(a)(2), 23-95-9(d)) (using nearly identical language). 
79 See, e.g., S. 1014, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 507(b) (Pa. 2018) (requiring a 
nonparticipating provider to notify patients of the provider’s nonparticipation and to have the 
patient sign a form acknowledging he or she is solely responsible for amounts charged in excess of 
the approved single-payer rates, and imposing penalties of up to 200% of the amount billed to a 
patient for a provider’s noncompliance). 
80 S. 786, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 2 (S.C. 2015) (§§ 44-18-920, 44-18-940). 
2020] Federalism, ERISA, and State Single-Payer Health Care 407 
Standing alone, the Provider Restriction model may move individuals 
into the single-payer plan and out of employer-based plans, but it does not 
capture employers’ expenditures on health coverage. Thus, a provider 
restriction would almost certainly need to be paired with a payroll tax or other 
funding mechanism to capture employers’ financial contributions. In effect, 
the provider restrictions in this model are designed to simulate the effects of 
a nonduplication provision through provider regulation: they limit the market 
for employer-based coverage by shrinking the provider networks for that 
coverage, but without triggering ERISA preemption. 
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary-Payer 
A third variation, the Type C model, includes an explicit subrogation, 
assignment, or secondary-payer provision to facilitate the single-payer plan’s 
ability to recover paid claims from collateral sources of coverage, including 
employer-based plans.81 Twenty-five bills across nine states employ a Type-C 
subrogation, assignment or secondary-payer provision.82 
Subrogation is the action, typically by an insurance carrier, to assert the 
rights of the insured to reimbursement or payment against a third party.83 In 
the single-payer context, the single-payer plan could pay for the health care 
services of a member, and then assert a subrogation claim to recover those 
costs against a third party that is responsible for paying for the member’s care, 
including collateral sources of health coverage. Oregon’s most recent single-
payer bill provides an example of a subrogation provision: 
(2) The Oregon Health Authority is subrogated to the rights of any 
participant that has a claim against an insurer, tortfeasor, employer, third party 
administrator, pension manager, public or private corporation, government 
entity or any other person that may be liable for the cost of health services 
provided to the participant and paid for by the Health Care for All Oregon 
Plan.  
(3) The authority may enter into an agreement with any person for the 
prepayment of claims anticipated to arise under subsection (2) of this section 
during a biennium. At the end of each biennium, the authority shall 
 
81 Other collateral sources may include out-of-state coverage, government payers where a 
waiver is not secured, TRICARE, federal employee health benefit plans, tortfeasors, workers 
compensation plans, accident or auto insurance policies, or other plans that are not included in the 
single-payer plan. 
82 See infra Table 2. 
83 Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The principle under which an 
insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and remedies 
belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by the policy.”). 
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appropriately charge or refund to the payer the difference between the 
amount prepaid and the amount due.84 
An assignment of benefits is a legal agreement where the individual 
agrees to transfer the right to reimbursement for his or her health care 
services to another party, typically to a provider.85 In the single-payer context, 
an assignment provision would transfer to the single-payer plan the 
individual’s right to reimbursement from another third-party payer, such as a 
health plan.86 
Similarly, secondary-payer provisions make the single-payer plan the 
secondary payer to any other coverage the patient may have, including 
employer-based coverage.87 This means that the collateral source of coverage 
has the first obligation to pay for the patient’s services, and the single-payer 
plan will only pay for services not otherwise covered by the primary payer. 
The secondary-payer provision may be paired with a subrogation provision 
that authorizes the state single-payer plan to recover amounts that it paid that 
were the responsibility of the primary payer.88 
To illustrate the mechanics of these provisions, assume an employee gets 
an MRI and a bill for $800 for the service. Her employer’s plan agrees to pay 
up to $1,000 for an MRI. Under a subrogation provision, the state single-
payer plan would pay the provider’s bill of $800, then charge the employer 
$800.89 Under an assignment provision, similarly, the state single-payer plan 
 
84 S. 631, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 15(2), (3) (Or. 2015) (emphasis added). 
85 See 46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2001 (Dec. 2019 update) (“A form authorizing a [health care 
provider] to receive payment of a patient’s insurance benefits is sufficient to effect an assignment of 
the patient’s claim against the insurance company to the [health care provider].” 
86 See, for example, the single-payer bill introduced in Rhode Island in 2018, which provides: 
Receipt of health care services under the plan shall be deemed an assignment by the 
[Rhode Island single payer plan] participant of any right to payment for services from 
a policy of insurance, a health benefit plan or other source. The other source of health 
care benefits shall pay to the fund all amounts it is obligated to pay to, or on behalf of, 
the [Rhode Island single payer plan] participant for covered health care services. The 
director may commence any action necessary to recover the amounts due. 
S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (R.I. 2018) (§ 23-95-12(g)). 
87 See, e.g., H.R. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. pt. A (Me. 2017) (§ 7506) (providing that 
“Healthy Maine serves as a secondary payor” and that the total of primary and secondary payments 
“may not exceed the amount that Healthy Maine would pay if it were the only payor”). 
88 See id. (“Healthy Maine may recover health care payments from any other collateral source, 
such as a health insurance plan, health benefit plan or other payor that is primary to Healthy Maine.”). 
89 For an example of a bill with a subrogation provision, see S. 810, 2011–2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
§ 1 (Cal. 2011) (§ 140302(a)), which provides that 
[U]ntil such time as the role of all other payers for health care services has been 
terminated, costs for health care services shall be collected from collateral sources 
whenever health care services provided to an individual are, or may be, covered 
services under a policy of insurance, health care service plan, or other collateral source 
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would assume the employee’s right to receive $800 from the employer plan 
and would pay the provider on the employee’s behalf, then assess an $800 
charge on the employer to pay back the state fund.90 Under a secondary-
payer provision, the employer plan must pay the $800 bill and the state 
single-payer plan is relieved of its obligation to pay.91 
In proposals using a Type C—Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-Payer 
model, if a patient has dual coverage in both the single-payer plan and another 
plan, such as employer-sponsored coverage, the single-payer plan is able to 
seek reimbursement from the other plan (the collateral source of coverage) 
for any services provided. In states where providers are permitted to bill 
collateral sources, the single-payer plan would just be responsible for 
patient cost-sharing and services not covered by the collateral source. Using 
the MRI example from above, the MRI provider could bill the patient’s 
employer plan $800 for the MRI. If the patient had a $500 deductible under 
her employer plan, the patient would ordinarily owe $500 to the MRI 
provider. However, the state single-payer plan, which does not permit 
patient cost-sharing, would then function as supplemental coverage and pay 
the patient’s $500 cost-sharing, and the employer would pay $300.92 Thus, 
the assignment, subrogation, or secondary-payer provision saves the 
single-payer plan money by turning first to collateral sources of coverage,93 
which may reduce the amount of payroll or other taxes required to fund 
the single-payer program. It also contains an implied acknowledgement 
that employers may continue to offer coverage if they so choose. The 
circuitous inefficiency of these Type C pay-and-recoup provisions illustrate 
the contortions that ERISA forces states into. These provisions would be 
unnecessary if the state could simply mandate that employers offer 
coverage to employees through the state single-payer plan or cease 
 
available to that individual, or for which the individual has a right of action for 
compensation to the extent permitted by law. 
90 See, e.g., S. 2237, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3 (authorizing the state single-payer plan’s director 
to take “any action necessary” to recover these funds). 
91 See, e.g., H.R. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. pt. A (Me. 2017) (providing that if the employer 
plan should have paid and did not, the state single-payer plan can pay and recoup the bill from the 
employer plan). 
92 See, e.g., S. 1014, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. §§ 503(c), 505, 506, 507 (Pa. 2018) 
(providing that the state plan is subrogated to and deemed an assignee of a participant’s duplicate 
coverage, prohibiting providers from charging participants for cost-sharing, and not prohibiting 
providers from billing a participant’s duplicate coverage). 
93 See, e.g., S. 1125, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess., § 3(3)(a) (Minn. 2019) (providing that “[t]he 
Minnesota Health Plan shall seek reimbursement from the collateral source for services provided to 
the individual . . . . Upon demand, the collateral source shall pay to the Minnesota Health Fund the 
sums it would have paid or expended on behalf of the individual for the health care services provided 
by the Minnesota Health Plan.”). 
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providing employer-based coverage altogether because the possibility of 
dual coverage would be eliminated. 
For administrative ease, however, providers may simply want to bill the 
single-payer plan for all services provided to dually covered patients, and 
the Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-Payer provisions allow the single 
payer to pay the provider and then recover payment from the collateral 
source. This would allow the single-payer plan to recapture some of the 
employer expenditures: not what it spends on premiums, but the amount it 
pays in claims. The Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-Payer model may 
be particularly useful to capture expenditures of out-of-state employers, 
who may not be subject to the state’s payroll tax requirements. 
Three states in our dataset—Ohio, Rhode Island, and Maine—had bills 
that combine Types B and C.94 Ohio’s single-payer bills contain provisions 
that require providers to seek payment only from the state single-payer 
plan, a provision subrogating the rights of the single-payer plan to all rights 
of a participant against a collateral source of payment, and a provision 
assigning from the participant to the single payer plan any rights to 
receive payment for services from any other source.95 Combining Types B 
and C creates a mechanism to pull both employees and the employer 
expenditures into the single-payer plan: (1) participating providers are 
required to seek payment only from the single payer; (2) all services 
provided to state residents will be paid by the single payer at the established 
rates; and (3) if the patient is dually covered by an employer plan or other 
coverage, then the single-payer entity will seek reimbursement from the 
collateral source. In this way, the single-payer system can capture some of 
the employer expenditures on claims paid. For patients with dual coverage, 
it effectively transforms the single-payer plan into the billing agent of the 
provider. The employer can still pay claims to the single-payer plan if it 
elects to keep its private plan, but it may be easier and cheaper to simply 
stop covering the employees in that state and pay a payroll tax per 
employee instead. This model still relies upon a payroll tax or other way 
to capture the employer funds saved if an employer stops providing 
coverage to its employees, but it allows the single payer to capture health 
expenditures from third-party payers that continue to exist outside the 
single-payer system.96 
 
94 See generally H.R. 5611, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2019); H.R. 440, 132d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); H.R. 962, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013). 
95 E.g., H.R. 440, 132d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Ohio 2017) (§§ 3920.04(B)(15)(g), 3920.09(C)-
(D), 3920.13). 
96 As noted below in subsection II.A.3, however, application of these provisions to self-insured 
employer plans would be preempted. 
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A handful of bills only contain a Type C subrogation, assignment, or 
secondary-payer provision and no Funding Plan or Provider Restriction 
provisions.97 A standalone Type C provision will do little to capture 
employer expenditures or move individuals into the single-payer plan and 
suggests that the state may anticipate the persistence of a multipayer 
system. Most of these Type-C-only plans provide for future development 
of the funding provisions, and such payroll or income taxes would do most 
of the work of moving people and funds into the state’s plan. A standalone 
Type C provision, particularly secondary-payer, may even keep people in 
dual coverage longer than if they were paying for employer coverage that 
they rarely used (because the state plan would pay their claims). In some 
cases, other features suggest a standalone secondary-payer bill may not 
actually establish a single-payer system, but rather may establish a public 
option to compete with private plans without displacing private coverage 
altogether.98 
A summary of the different types of mechanisms that state single-payer 
bills use to capture employer expenditures is listed in Table 1. The number 
of state proposals that contain each of the mechanisms (Types A, B, and 
C) are listed in Table 2. Note that proposals that feature more than one 
type of provision are counted more than once. 
  
 
97 H.R. 316, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2019); S. 5222, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019); 
H.R. 6285, 99th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2018); H.R. 887, 127th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017); S. 
631, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015). 
98 For example, S. 5222 in Washington would allow employers that provide minimum essential 
coverage to employees to apply for an exemption from the payroll taxes to pay for the state plan. 
See S. 5222, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 114(1) (Wash. 2019). Moreover, the bill does not contain a 
nonduplication provision and allows providers to continue to bill other payers. H.R. 6285 in 
Michigan creates a state plan that would be secondary to other coverage. H.R. 6285, 99th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. § 408(2)-(4) (Mich. 2018). Providers remain free to contract with and bill third-party 
payers, but only at rates less than the state plan’s rates. Id. § 306(2). Employers may participate 
voluntarily. Id. § 202(1). 
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Table 1: Types of State Single-Payer Provisions 
Type Description 
Type A – Funding Plan 
Impose a payroll tax on employers 
and/or income tax on individuals to 
fund single-payer plan 
Type B – Provider Restriction 
Participating providers may only 
bill the single-payer system 
Type C – Assignment/ 
Subrogation/Secondary Payer 
Single payer can pay for services 
and seek reimbursement from 
other payers (pay-and-recoup 
provision) 
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Table 2: Number of State Single Payer Proposals by Type 
Type Proposals 
# of  
Proposals 
# of  
States 
A                                  
(Funding  
Plan) 
 
45 16 
CA SB810,  DE HB392,  DE HB74,   
IA HF2352,  IA HF96,  IL HB207,  
IL HB311,  IL HB942,  IL HF2436,   
IL SB2177,  MA HB1026,  MA HB2987,  
MA SB501,  MA SB515,  MD HB1087,   
ME HP1026,  MN SF8,  MN SF912,  
MN SF2163,  MN SF219,  MN SF1125,   
NJ AB4945,  NY AB5062,  NYAB5248,  
NY AB5389,  NY AB7860,  NY SB4840,   
OH HB440,  OH SB104,  OHSB137,  
OH HB292,  PA HB1688,  PA HB2551,   
PA SB1014,  PA SB400,  RI HB5611,  
RI SB2237,  RI SB 2824,  SC SB786,   
VT HB202,  WA HB1104,  WA SB5224,   
WA SB5609,  WA SB5741,  WA SB5747   
B                                                   
(Provider 
Restriction) 
CA SB562,  FL SB1486,  FL SB1872,   
IA HF2352,  IA HF96,  IL HB207,  
IL HB311,  IL HB942,  IL HF2436,   
IL SB2177,  MA HB1026,  MA HB2987,  
MA SB501,  MA SB515,  MD HB1087,   
MD HB1516,  ME HP1026, ME HP962,   
NJ AB4945,  NY AB5062,  NY AB5248,   
NY AB5389,  NY SB4840,  OH HB287,   
OH HB440,  OH SB104,  OH SB137,   
OH HB292, RI HB5611,  RI SB2237,   
RI SB2824,  SC SB786,  VT HB80,   
WA SB5957   
34 14 
C                                                                                                                                        
(Assignment,  
Subrogation,  
Secondary 
Payer) 
ME HP1026,  ME HP316,  ME HP887,   
ME HP962,  MI HB6285,  MN SF8,  
MN SF912,  MN SF2163,  MN SF219,   
MN SF1125,  OH HB287,  OH HB440,   
OH SB104,  OH SB137,  OH HB292,   
OR SB631,  PA HB1688,  PA HB2551,   
PA SB1014,  PA SB400,  RI HB5611,   
RI SB2237,  VT HB202,  WA HB1104,   
WA SB5222 
 
25 
 
9 
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4. Summarizing the Models to Capture Employer Spending 
The necessity of a payroll tax or other funding mechanism to capture 
employer expenditures means that most proposals combine a Funding Plan 
with either a Provider Restriction or Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-
Payer provision.99 Other states have single-payer bills that lack a specific 
Funding Plan but contain a Provider Restriction or an Assignment/
Subrogation/Secondary-Payer provision.100 All Type B and C plans will 
eventually require a funding mechanism, even if the bills leave the details to 
be determined later. A proposal’s lack of a specific revenue plan may reflect 
the political or technical difficulty of determining the precise levels of each 
type of tax needed to pay for the system. Thus, while it may be possible to 
design a single-payer plan without either a Provider Restriction or a 
Subrogation/Assignment/Secondary-Payer provision, it is not possible to 
imagine a viable single-payer plan that lacks a financing mechanism. The 
taxes in Type A proposals draw employees and employer expenditures into 
the single-payer plan, while the Type B and C proposals use provider 
regulation or assignment/subrogation/secondary-payer provisions to bolster 
the movement of people and funds into the single-payer plan. 
All these models, particularly Types B and C, implicitly contemplate that 
some employers may continue to offer employer-based coverage, at least 
during a transition period before the system settles into equilibrium. As such, 
these models may also improve the ERISA-resistance of the single-payer 
proposal as a whole. 
In response to ERISA, the emerging models for state single-payer plans 
use a combination of nudges and incentives operating on all the various actors 
in the health care transaction. Employers are encouraged, but not required, 
by the payroll tax to drop their employee coverage in the single-payer state. 
Providers are given incentives to participate in the single-payer plan and thus 
relinquish the ability to charge any other party for their services, including 
the individual patient or employer plans. Employees likely will choose the 
state-single payer plan and drop their employer plan, because the single-payer 
plan’s broad provider network, lower cost-sharing, and comprehensive 
coverage will make it more attractive. Even if employees keep their employer-
sponsored plans, the state single-payer plan may pay the providers and seek 
 
99 See, e.g., A. 4738-A, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 3-4 (N.Y. 2018) (combining a payroll tax, 
unearned income tax, and a provider restriction); S. 1014, 2017–2018 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. 
§§ 505, 904, 905 (Pa. 2018) (combining a payroll tax, income tax, and subrogation and assignment 
provisions). See also infra Appendix A. 
100 See, e.g., H.D. 1516, 2018 Leg., 438th Sess. § 1 (Md. 2018) (providing for a revenue plan to 
be developed and a provider restriction); S. 631, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. §§ 15, 16 (Or. 2015) (providing 
for a revenue plan to be developed and a subrogation provision). 
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reimbursement from this collateral source. The legal question we turn to in 
the next Part is whether ERISA preempts these nudges and incentives 
designed to pull employees and employer health spending through state 
single-payer plans. 
II. ERISA’S OBSTACLES TO STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS 
States’ powers to regulate their health care systems are historic and 
expansive, but bounded by federal laws that limit state regulatory power through 
preemption. One federal law has erected a notorious obstacle to state 
regulation of health insurance: ERISA.101 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 
to regulate pensions (hence the “Retirement Income Security” in its title),102 
but the statute’s broad preemption language has wrought unintended 
consequences, blocking numerous state health reform laws over the past forty 
years as impermissibly “relat[ing] to” employer-sponsored health insurance. 
ERISA’s formidable preemption barrier is not, however, impassible. The 
ERISA preemption scheme allows states to regulate some aspects of the 
insurance industry, provider payments, and general revenues. State laws that 
manage to wriggle through the narrow space between permitted targets of 
regulation and impermissible burdens on employer-sponsored plans may 
survive preemption. 
Whether state-based single-payer plans survive ERISA preemption is the 
billion-dollar question posed in Part I. The logical answer is that ERISA 
preemption poses a substantial obstacle to these state efforts, but the plans 
should survive if carefully drafted to do so. The practical answer is that 
ERISA preemption doctrine and precedent have become so harsh and 
unstable that they cast a pall of uncertainty, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, and 
invite litigation challenging these state efforts no matter where they arise. 
A. The ERISA Preemption Labyrinth 
Preemption generally describes the displacement of one legal authority 
by another legal authority in an established hierarchy.103 The U.S. 
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause makes duly enacted federal law the 
 
101 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2018)). 
102 See, e.g., James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption, Part 1, 14 
J. PENSION BENEFITS 31, 31-35 (2006). 
103 Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “preemption” as “[t]he 
principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can supersede or supplant any 
inconsistent state law or regulation”); Nelson, supra note 11, at 225 n.3 (defining “preemption” 
as “the displacement of state law by federal statutes (or by courts seeking to fill gaps in federal 
statutes)”). 
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“supreme law of the land,” and subordinates state laws “to the contrary.”104 
Preemption doctrine thus plays a crucial role in maintaining order in a federal 
system and policing the boundaries of authority.105 
These boundaries, however, are porous, poorly defined, and disorderly at 
many important junctures.106 Preemption doctrine has evolved a taxonomy of 
forms to determine which conflicts of authority have preemptive effect.107 
The taxonomy relies on divination of congressional intent behind the federal 
law,108 identification of the federal law’s points of friction with state laws, and 
selection of the degree to which the laws may coexist.109 Congress may 
explicitly express its intention to preempt state law, or that intent may be 
implied.110 Even when Congress expresses its wishes for preemption, those 
provisions invite plenty of ambiguity and room for interpretation.111 
ERISA exemplifies the phenomenon of expressed but ambiguous 
preemption provisions because the statute’s preemption is both forcefully-
worded and inscrutable. Although passed primarily with pension benefits in 
 
104 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; cf. generally Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding Innovation: State 
Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225 (2018) (discussing similar 
interactions between state laws and subordinate local laws). 
105 See generally Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve, Conclusion: Preemption Doctrine and 
Its Limits, in FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 309 (Richard A. 
Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007); PREEMPTION CHOICE (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). 
106 See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the Presumption 
Against Preemption, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 95, 95, 96-100 (2016) [hereinafter McCuskey, Body of 
Preemption]. 
107 See David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1137-38 (2012) 
(explaining the Supreme Court’s preemption taxonomy). 
108 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (plurality opinion of 
O’Connor, J.) (“The question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of 
congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” (internal quotation marks 
and brackets omitted)). 
109 See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 96-97. 
110 See, e.g., Max N. Helveston, Preemption Without Borders: The Modern Conflation of Tort and 
Contract Liabilities, 48 GA. L. REV. 1085, 1088 (2014) (“Federal preemption occurs either when 
federal law explicitly states that it was intended to override state law (express preemption) or when 
continued enforcement of state law would conflict with federal law (implied, obstacle, or 
impossibility preemption).”); Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8 
(2013) (describing implied preemption as resulting from an interpretation of the statute rather than 
its direct text). 
111 See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 866, 872-73 (2000) (holding that 
implied preemption may be recognized even when the statute has different, express preemption 
provisions); Meltzer, supra note 110, at 30-31 (noting the variety of interpretive methods applied to 
express preemption provisions); Jamelle C. Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
163, 216 (2011) (“Although an express preemption or saving clause can be clear evidence of Congress’s 
preemptive intent, it may not be definitive evidence.”); see also Brendan S. Maher, The Affordable Care 
Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 649, 702 (2014) (observing that “[t]he doctrine 
of preemption—and obstacle preemption in particular—is quite muddled”). 
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mind,112 ERISA applies to all employer-sponsored benefits and expressly 
extends to plans that provide “medical, surgical, or hospital care or 
benefits,” whether “through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.”113 
ERISA’s original purposes were to safeguard employees’ pensions and to 
encourage employers’ provision of pension benefits by establishing a uniform 
system of federal regulation and limiting employees’ remedies.114 ERISA, 
however, “does not go about protecting plan participants . . . by requiring 
employers to provide any given set of minimum benefits, but instead controls 
the administration of benefit plans”115 if employers choose to provide them. 
To promote uniformity116 and encourage multistate employers to provide 
benefits, Congress wrote into ERISA a “terse but comprehensive”117 provision 
expressly preempting “any and all” state laws118 that “relate to” any “benefit 
plan[s]”119 covered by the Act.120 Even state laws friendly to ERISA’s goals 
have run afoul of its preemption.121 
 
112 See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER MAJOR 
POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 74-77 (2008); Wooten, supra note 102. 
113 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (2018); see, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield 
Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 650-51 (1995) (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)). But cf. 
PATASHNIK, supra note 112, at 83 (noting scholarly disagreement about how far Congress intended 
ERISA to intrude on health insurance regulation, but agreement on “the importance of the 
preemption provision for health politics and policy”). 
114 See, for example, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), which declares ERISA’s policy as being 
to protect interstate commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit 
plans and their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants 
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by 
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries of 
employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies, sanctions, and 
ready access to the Federal courts. 
See also id. § 1001a(a)(1) (declaring “multiemployer pension plans” to be targets of ERISA’s 
policies); id. § 1001b(a)(1) (declaring “single-employer defined benefit pension plans” to be 
targets of ERISA’s policies). 
115 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651. 
116 See Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“The purpose of ERISA is to 
provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”). 
117 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016); see also generally Wooten, 
supra note 102. 
118 ERISA defines state laws as “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other State action 
having the effect of law,” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(c)(1), and includes both states and “any political 
subdivisions thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either, which purports to regulate, directly or 
indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by [ERISA],” id. § 1144(c)(2). 
119 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The preemption provision was originally included as § 514 of ERISA. 
Pub. L. No. 93-406, § 514, 88 Stat. 829, 897 (1974), and is commonly referred to by its original 
section number, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). 
120 The preemption provision took effect on January 1, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); cf. id. 
§ 1144(b)(1) (stating that ERISA does not apply retroactively from that date). 
121 See, e.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988) 
(“Legislative ‘good intentions’ do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope of § 514(a).”). 
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The “relates to” provision “may be the most expansive express pre-
emption provision in any federal statute.”122 But ERISA contains a “savings 
clause,” which exempts state regulation of “insurance” from preemption 
under the statute.123 States may not, however, “deem[]” an employee benefit 
plan or trust “to be an insurance company . . . or to be engaged in the business 
of insurance” in order to regulate it under the savings clause.124 In the health 
benefits context, courts have interpreted this to exempt employers’ self-
funded health plans from state “insurance” laws.125 The preemption clause, 
savings clause, and “deemer” clause structure illustrate the whipsaw of ERISA 
preemption: the broadest preemption statement, followed by a broad 
exception to that preemption, finished with an exception to the exception, 
restoring preemption.126 
The Court’s ERISA preemption jurisprudence has, over the past four 
decades, attempted to navigate a workable course between the “broad scope 
Congress intended” and the “susceptibility to limitless application” its chosen 
words engender.127 The quest for workable standards in light of the clause’s 
“indeterminacy” has resulted in an ERISA preemption doctrine that rejects 
“uncritical literalism,”128 but replaces it with a complex analytical framework 
whose outcomes can be difficult to predict. It is a mess. 
 
122 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947 (Thomas, J., concurring); but cf. Meltzer, supra note 110, at 20 
(noting that other statutes like the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of 1995 use 
“related to” preemption language, but that ERISA’s is the “most frequently litigated”). 
123 Nothing in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any 
State which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). This clause 
preserves states’ ability to directly regulate the “business of insurance.” See, e.g., Ky. Ass’n of Health 
Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 332, 339, 341-42 (2003) (holding that “any willing provider” laws were 
not preempted); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 299-305 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding 
that pharmacy benefit manager legislation was saved from preemption); but see Pharm Care Mgmt. 
Ass’n v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 2017) (holding that ERISA preempted Iowa’s regulation 
of pharmacy benefit managers that provided services to ERISA plans). ERISA also contains a 
provision that expressly preserves other federal laws, stating that they are not preempted if ERISA’s 
application would “alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede” them. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d); 
see Shaw, 463 U.S. at 91, 101-06 . 
124 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B). 
125 See infra subsection II.A.2.b. 
126 See Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State 
Health Reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 142, 144-46 (1994) (explaining the “intricate three-step dance of the 
‘relate to,’ ‘savings,’ and ‘deemer’ clauses”). 
127 Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943; see also id. at 948 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting how 
“uncomfortable” the Court became with the volume of state law preempted by a literal reading). 
128 N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 655-56 (1995); see also Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf ’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316, 336 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that the preemption clause’s furthest literal 
interpretations produce infinite preemption that “no sensible person could have intended”). 
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The Supreme Court has interpreted “relates to” broadly, while crafting 
limiting principles to deal with the “unhelpful” phrasing,129 so that not every 
relationship to employee benefit plans invalidates a state law. Per the Court’s 
interpretation, state laws impermissibly “relate to” employee benefit plans by 
making “reference to” those plans,130 by “act[ing] immediately and exclusively 
upon ERISA plans,” or by making “the existence of ERISA plans . . . essential 
to the law’s operation.”131 
State laws also may “relate to” ERISA plans by having too strong a 
“connection with” them, such as when a state law “governs the payment of 
benefits, a central matter of plan administration,” or “interferes with 
nationally uniform plan administration,”132 or indirectly produces “economic 
effects” which would “force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of 
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers.”133 Thus, 
ERISA would preempt state laws that require employers to offer health 
benefits or impose requirements on the benefits offered as impermissibly 
relating to an employee benefit plan.134 The concept of a forced choice or 
“Hobson’s choice” plays an important role in distinguishing preempted state 
laws from permitted ones.135 State laws that nudge too hard may leave 
employers with only the illusion of choice in whether to offer benefits and 
what to cover.136 Those laws are preempted as impermissibly relating to 
 
129 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655-56 (calling the preemption language “unhelpful” and 
rejecting a literal reading of the phrase); accord Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 
724, 739 (1985) (acknowledging that the preemption provisions read together are “not a model of 
legislative drafting”). 
130 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 86, 96-97 (1983)). 
131 Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325. 
132 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 147-48 (2001). 
133 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; see Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (collecting cases where state laws 
were preempted on the basis of “impermissible ‘connection[s] with’ ERISA plans”); see also Egelhoff, 
532 U.S. at 146-47 (reviewing the Court’s previous applications of the “connection with” inquiry); 
Shaw, 463 U.S. at 97-100 (finding that laws effectively requiring employers to “pay employees 
specific benefits” are preempted). 
134 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a “substantive mandate” on health benefits 
would be preempted); Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to Increasing Health Care 
Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 292 (1990) (explaining that “state level employer 
mandates” are preempted). 
135 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a state tax so high as to “leave[e] consumers 
with a Hobson’s choice would be treated as imposing a substantive mandate”); Retail Indus. Leaders 
Ass’n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp. 2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006) (determining that “[t]he ‘choice’ here is a 
Hobson’s choice” and therefore preempted); see also Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 
180, 202 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting) (“Paying the assessment would . . . not be a financial 
burden that leaves Wal–Mart with a Hobson’s choice, that is, no real choice but to increase health 
insurance benefits.”). 
136 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664. 
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ERISA plans.137 But state laws that merely make certain choices more 
attractive than others may survive;138 their connection is “too tenuous, 
remote, or peripheral” for preemption.139 
Additionally, beyond ERISA’s capacious express preemption provisions, 
the regular doctrine of conflict preemption would invalidate those state 
efforts that impermissibly conflict with or create obstacles to ERISA rules.140 
Even good arguments for why novel state efforts should slip through are 
doubtful, due to the breadth of the preemption, courts’ singular focus on 
uniformity, and the statute’s unfortunate wording. In the realm of ERISA, 
courts usually resolve indeterminacy to favor preemption. 
In a health reform landscape already fraught with uncertainty and 
indeterminacy,141 ERISA has wreaked havoc on state health regulation and 
reform efforts.142 The expansive “relates to” provision has preempted 
everything from direct mandates for employer benefits to statutory rules of 
general applicability that indirectly burden employers’ decisions about their 
plans and how much those plans will cost. In its most recent ERISA opinion 
in Gobeille, for example, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted 
Vermont’s requirement that “all health insurers, health care providers, health 
care facilities, and governmental agencies” report data on health care costs to 
 
137 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n, 475 F.3d at 193-94 (“Because the Fair Share Act effectively 
mandates that employers structure their employee healthcare plans to provide a certain level of 
benefits, the Act has an obvious ‘conection with’ employee benefit plans and so is preempted by 
ERISA.”). 
138 See, for example, Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664, which upheld a state law against an ERISA 
preemption challenge on the basis that 
[N]o showing has been made here that the surcharges are so prohibitive as to force all 
health insurance consumers to contract with the Blues. As they currently stand, the 
surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one insurer, or to insure against an 
entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave without coverage. 
139 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21 (1983). 
140 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) 
(finding that Congress did not intend to “fundamentally . . . alter traditional preemption analysis” 
when it wrote ERISA’s express preemption language); see also Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 841-44 
(1997) (applying conflict preemption to ERISA). 
141 See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 96-100; see also Scott L. Greer & Peter 
D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 203, 206 (2010) 
(recognizing “that the distressing litany of historical failure at both the state and federal levels 
provides no guidance in answering the question of federalism in health care reform”). 
142 See, e.g., Gregory Acs et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, 
and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF. 266, 267 (1996) (“ERISA preemption is very controversial.”); 
Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 433, 465 (2010) 
(noting that ERISA’s provisions “regularly capture[]” the Supreme Court’s attention); Bobinski, 
supra note 134, at 278 (explaining that ERISA’s “complex and somewhat opaque” preemption 
provisions have “spawned extensive litigation, as employers and states struggle to define the limits 
of state power to regulate health insurance”). 
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an “all-payer claims database,” even where the plans already collected the data 
at issue and self-funded plans contracted with an insurance company affiliate 
to do so.143 
Yet explicit references to employer plans are not always fatal to state 
laws,144 nor are the dividing lines for coercive versus permitted economic 
effects clearly drawn.145 State and local health insurance reforms prior to the 
ACA met a multitude of fates when challenged in court. These reforms 
include regulations targeting providers (hospitals and doctors), employer 
contribution provisions (also called pay-or-play laws), and regulation of 
insurance coverage and administration.146 
1. Provider Regulation 
State regulation of health care providers typically falls outside ERISA’s 
reach, despite substantial indirect economic effects on employee benefit plans. 
Regulation of provider rates, taxation of health care facilities, medical quality-
control regulations, and general health care delivery regulations are not 
preempted.147 As with most other applications of ERISA, however, the analysis 
is not always so straightforward when insurance reimbursement gets involved. 
 
143 Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 941, 947 (2016). 
144 Compare District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) 
(holding state law specifically referring to ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans preempted “on 
that basis alone”), with Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf ’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 
U.S. 316, 328 (1997) (holding that state law which can function irrespective of ERISA plans does 
not impermissibly “reference” ERISA plans). 
145 State legislative purpose is “relevant only as it may relate to the ‘scope of the state law that 
Congress understood would survive’” preemption or “‘the nature of the effect of the state law on 
ERISA plans.’” Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 946 (quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 656 (1995); Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325); see also 
Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988) (“Legislative ‘good 
intentions’ do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope of ” ERISA preemption). 
146 See generally Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 126; Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of 
ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 88 (2009). 
States have endeavored to reform other aspects of their health care systems, especially cost 
structures, which are not as obviously related to the single-payer insurance reforms discussed here. 
See, e.g., Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(holding a district law regulating pharmaceutical benefits managers to be partially preempted); 
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301-05 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that similar 
legislation was not preempted); see generally Erin C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, ERISA as a Barrier 
for State Health Care Transparency Efforts, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH & HEALTH CARE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 301 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2019). 
147 See, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1997) 
(holding that state tax on gross receipts of health care facilities is not preempted by ERISA); 
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 330-31 (noting that traditional areas of state action such as medical care 
quality standards and hospital workplace regulations are too remote to affect choices made by ERISA 
plans); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65 (reasoning that surcharges are non-preempted economic 
influences because they do not require plans to deal with only one insurer). 
422 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 168: 389 
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Insurance Co., the Supreme Court established both the modern understanding 
of the “connection with” preemption standard, and the modern analysis of 
how provider regulation may indirectly impact employer-sponsored health 
benefits.148 The New York law challenged in Travelers imposed a twenty-four 
percent surcharge on hospital bills for patients covered by commercial 
insurance other than Blue Cross or Blue Shield (“Blue plans”) to cover the 
externalized costs—borne by Medicaid, Blue plans, and community 
hospitals—that enabled commercial insurers and HMOs to charge lower rates 
and enroll healthier populations.149 Although the surcharge was based on 
providers’ bills and was collected by the providers, it was designed to impact 
the cost structure for third-party payers of those bills and in particular to 
make Blue plans more attractive.150 Thus, the surcharge had an “indirect 
economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including ERISA 
plans.”151 Travelers held that this indirect economic incentive to buy Blue plans 
did not trigger ERISA preemption because it did not “bind plan 
administrators to any particular choice” of plan and did not “force” employers 
to contract with Blue plans.152 
Travelers established that general health care regulations’ indirect 
economic influence over employer health insurance choices may survive 
preemption, but only to a degree. While the twenty-four percent surcharge 
on hospital services was not “so prohibitive as to force all health insurance 
consumers to contract with” Blue plans, the Court posed that “there might be 
a point at which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson’s choice 
would be treated as imposing a substantive mandate” on employers’ insurance 
choices and therefore preempted.153 
 
148 514 U.S. at 651-62; see also Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and 
Potential Lessons from Massachusetts, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2007). This decision came after 
multiple states attempted to include employers in health care reform without triggering ERISA 
preemption. 
149 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 649-50. The law included an additional assessment on HMOs directly, 
varying with the number of Medicaid enrollees in the HMO, which was paid by the HMO to the 
state’s general fund. Id. at 650. At the time, New Jersey enacted a similar rate-setting statute that 
had survived preemption analysis in the Third Circuit. See id. at 654 (noting the Third Circuit 
decision and its conflict with the Second Circuit decision below in Travelers). 
150 See id. at 659 (observing that the “surcharges . . . make the Blues more attractive . . . as 
insurance alternatives”); see Monahan, supra note 148, at 1208 (finding that state laws with 
connections to ERISA plans may relate to such plans even if ERISA is not explicitely referenced). 
151 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659. 
152 Id. at 659, 664; see also id. at 664 (“[T]he surcharges do not require plans to deal with only 
one insurer, or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to 
leave without coverage.”). 
153 Id. at 664. 
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After Travelers, analysis of connection between state laws and ERISA 
plans has focused on the practical degree of choice left to the employer. A 
state tax on hospital gross receipts, for example, was among the “‘myriad state 
laws’ of general applicability that impose some burdens on the administration 
of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them within the meaning 
of the governing statute.”154 
2. Employer Contributions 
State and local governments’ efforts to nudge employers to contribute to 
their employees’ health care costs have not fared as well as provider 
regulations under ERISA preemption.155 Prior to the ACA’s federal employer 
mandate, several state and local governments enacted “fair share”156 or “pay-
or-play” provisions requiring that employers offer a certain level of health 
benefits (play) or pay an assessment to the state for the difference (pay).157 
These laws’ fates under ERISA preemption thus far have turned on the nature 
and strength of the pay incentives and on employers’ political support.158 
Massachusetts’s 2006 comprehensive health reform statute,159 for 
example, included a requirement that employers with more than ten 
employees make “fair and reasonable premium contribution[s]” to employees’ 
health insurance coverage, or else pay an assessment of $295 per employee 
into a state fund.160 A few years after Massachusetts enacted its reforms, the 
Affordable Care Act enacted a federal “pay-or-play” provision modeled on 
 
154 De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997) (citing 
Travelers, 514 U.S., at 668); see id. at 815-16 & n.16 (concluding that while the tax would have some 
influence on the ERISA fund’s decision to provide benefits by operating clinics, its influence would 
not be so strong as to force a particular decision). 
155 See generally Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, ERISA Preemption of State “Play or Pay” Mandates: 
How PPACA Clouds an Already Confusing Picture, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 393, 404-17 (2010) 
(finding that most state legislative attempts to bypass ERISA by encouraging employers to offer 
employee health coverage either were voted down in state legislatures or faced continuous § 514 
challenges in the courts). 
156 See generally Julia Contreras & Orly Lobel, Wal-Martization and the Fair Share Health Care 
Acts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 105 (2006) (evaluating Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care Act, which 
required corporations of a certain size to either fund their own health care program or pay the 
difference into a state fund, and which was ultimately found to be preempted by ERISA). 
157 See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1205-06 (predicting that a Massachusetts’s pay-or-play law, 
with a relatively weak “pay” provision that would not be viewed as a disguised mandate, would be 
more likely to survive an ERISA preemption challenge). 
158 Id. at 1211-20; see Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 408-11 (noting that employers’ political 
support has sustained the Massachusetts health reform law both financially and legally by deterring 
litigation challenges). 
159 Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act of 2006, 2006 Mass. Acts 77. 
160 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a), (c)(10) (2009) (repealed 2013). Employers who do not 
arrange pre-tax payroll deductions for their employees’ health benefits face an additional assessment 
if their employees use the state-funded Health Safety Net program. Id. ch. 149, § 188(c)(10). 
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the Massachusetts statute,161 now colloquially referred to as the “employer 
mandate.”162 The Massachusetts employer mandate “[s]omewhat surprisingly” 
went unchallenged under ERISA,163 perhaps because the health reform bill 
enjoyed widespread political support from employers.164 
Elsewhere, employer trade groups have readily challenged pay-or-play 
legislation in court, leading to divergent approaches in the federal circuit 
courts starting in 2007. 
Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care Act,165 aimed at Walmart,166 required 
employers with more than 10,000 employees to spend a minimum of eight 
percent of their payroll on health care, or else pay the difference between the 
employer’s actual health care expenditures and the eight percent threshold 
into a state Medicaid fund.167 Walmart’s trade association sued. 
The Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder held that 
ERISA preempted Maryland’s pay-or-play law.168 The Fielder majority 
concentrated on the extent to which Maryland’s law impacted Walmart’s 
ability to uniformly administer its benefits nationwide.169 Fielder framed the 
inquiry in terms of choice: A state law that “directly regulates or effectively 
mandates some element” of employer plans is preempted, while a law that 
“creates only indirect economic incentives that affect but do not bind the 
 
161 Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Six Years Later, at 1, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. 
(May 1, 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/massachusetts-health-care-reform-six-
years-later [https://perma.cc/HTX2-MZHL]. 
162 See, e.g., Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/employer-shared-responsibility-provisions 
[https://perma.cc/KCA6-XD3E] (“The employer shared responsibility provisions are sometimes 
referred to as ‘the employer mandate’ or ‘the pay or play provisions.’”). 
163 Jacobson, supra note 146, at 93-94. There exists ample speculation, however, about how such 
a challenge would be resolved, if litigated. See, e.g., Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 410-11 (arguing 
that the law is vulnerable to ERISA preemption because it explicitly targets almost all employers 
and requires some level of health benefit payment, causing it to resemble an “effective mandate”); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 229, 232 (2007) (reaching the “regrettable conclusion” that ERISA preempts the 
Massachusetts law). 
164 See Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 410. Vermont enacted a provision similar to the 
Massachusetts employer mandate in 2006 and similarly met no litigation challenges. Id. at 412. 
165 See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (West 2019). 
166 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., 
dissenting) (“Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act . . . in 2006 to require very 
large employers, such as Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., to assume greater responsibility for employee health 
insurance costs that are now shunted to Medicaid.”). Suffolk County, New York enacted a similar 
“Wal-Mart law.” See Jacobson, supra note 146, at 94 (explaining that Suffolk County’s provision 
applied only to non-unionized retailers). 
167 Contreras & Lobel, supra note 156, at 105-06; see MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 15-
142(d), (f), (g) (2019); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. §§ 8.5-102–8.5-106 (2019). 
168 475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007). 
169 Id. at 183, 194-95, 198. 
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choices of employers” is not.170 Maryland’s law gave Walmart the choice of 
offering eight percent of its payroll in health benefits to its employees or 
paying that amount into the state Medicaid fund.171 
The Fourth Circuit found that “playing” by increasing benefits was, “[i]n 
effect, the only rational choice.”172 Offering the required level of health 
benefits would make Walmart a more attractive employer and help it recruit 
and retain employees,173 but “paying” that money to the state instead would 
not produce any benefit for Walmart, and might actually harm its employee 
morale and public reputation.174 Because the “pay” option was so undesirable 
for the employer, the Fourth Circuit held that the Act “effectively mandates 
that employers structure their employee healthcare plans to provide a certain 
level of benefits,” and therefore formed an impermissible “connection with” 
ERISA plans.175 
The Maryland Act “directly” targeted an employer, and nudged too hard 
on Walmart’s benefits decisions by failing to offer “meaningful alternatives” 
for compliance.176 Further, the majority in Fielder expressed concern that 
permitting Maryland to enforce its law would invite other states to regulate 
similarly and “force Wal-Mart . . . to monitor these varying laws and 
manipulate its healthcare spending to comply with them.”177 
State pay-or-play laws now must navigate around Fielder to survive 
preemption challenge. Shortly after Fielder in 2007, a New York district court 
held that although its decision was “not bound by the decision of the Fourth 
Circuit in Fielder,” a county-level play-or-pay regulation targeting Walmart 
was “substantially similar to the Maryland Act” and the court therefore held 
it to be preempted.178 But in 2008, San Francisco’s Health Care Security 
 
170 Id. at 192-93. 
171 Id. at 193. 
172 Id. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 193-94; see also id. at 193 (“The Act thus falls squarely under Shaw’s prohibition of 
state mandates on how employers structure their ERISA plans.” (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97)); 
but see id. at 201-02 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The Act expresses no preference for one method . . . or 
the other . . . . The Act does not compel an employer to establish or maintain an ERISA 
plan . . . . The Act does not impede an employer’s ability to administer its ERISA plans under 
nationally uniform provisions . . . . The Act does not mandate a certain level of ERISA benefits.”). 
176 Id. at 196-97; see Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d 403, 417 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although the Act provides employers with various alternative options to 
comply . . . , ‘the only rational choice employers have under [the Act] is to structure their ERISA 
healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold.’” (quoting Fielder, 475 F.3d 
at 193)); but see Fielder, 475 F.3d. at 202 (Michael, J., dissenting) (concluding that the “choice is real” 
under the Maryland statute because the “pay” amount is not “exorbitant”). 
177 Fielder, 475 F.3d at 197. 
178 See, e.g., Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 416. 
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Ordinance successfully avoided preemption before the Ninth Circuit in 
Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco.179 
San Francisco’s 2006 version of pay-or-play survived largely due to its 
inclusion of the “meaningful alternatives” missing in Fielder.180 If Fielder 
represents the preempted Hobson’s choice or forced choice for employer 
contributions, Golden Gate represents the non-preempted “meaningful” or 
true choice. 
The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance established a city-run 
health care program for low-to-moderate income residents.181 To help capture 
and maintain employer health care contributions in funding the program, the 
ordinance requires that employers make “required health care expenditures” 
to or on behalf of employees at regular intervals.182 The ordinance set the 
“health care expenditure rate”183 based on the number of hours worked, but 
left up to the employers what type of expenditures to make.184 Employers had 
“discretion” in choosing among all possible commercial and private options.185 
Employers also could choose a mix of different expenditures, as long as they 
met the required rate in total spend.186 
The Ninth Circuit observed that the ordinance did not force “creation” of 
ERISA plans, require employers to start offering health plans or change any 
existing health plans, or demand they provide specific benefits in any 
particular way.187 Rather, the ordinance prescribed only the dollar amount 
employers must spend and did not scrutinize much about how they spend the 
money or the “benefits derived from those dollars.”188 Combining a required 
expenditure rate with such broad discretion in how to spend it constituted an 
“even less direct . . . influence” on employer benefit decision than the one the 
Supreme Court upheld in Travelers.189 
 
179 546 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2008). 
180 Id. at 660 (“In stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment option under 
the San Francisco Ordinance offers employers a meaningful alternative that allows them to preserve 
the existing structure of their ERISA plans.”). 
181 S.F., Cal., Ordinance 218-06 (Aug. 5, 2006) (adding Chapter 14, §§ 14.1-14.8 to the San 
Francisco Administrative Code). 
182 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a) (2019) (capitalization altered); see Golden Gate, 546 
F.3d at 642-43. 
183 S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(6). 
184 Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644 (quoting City & County of S.F., Office of Labor Standards 
Enf ’t, Regulations Implementing the Employer Spending Requirement of the San Francisco Health 
Care Security Ordinance (ESR), Reg. 4.1(A)) (quotation marks omitted). 
185 Id. at 644-45 (citing S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(7); ESR Reg. 4.2(A)). 
186 Id. at 645-46. 
187 Id. at 646-47, 649-52. 
188 Id. at 647. 
189 Id. at 656 (citing N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. 
Co., 514 U.S. 645, 658-59 (1995)). 
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The nature of the choices facing San Francisco employers distinguished 
the ordinance from Maryland’s preempted law. The two laws differed little in 
the ultimate expenditure they required from employers, with Maryland’s 
calculated as a percentage of payroll and San Francisco’s calculated as a flat 
dollar amount per hour worked. The Maryland law, however, offered nothing 
new for the employer who chose the “pay” option, effectively rendering it a 
penalty for not offering suitable health insurance benefits.190 By contrast, the 
ordinance establishing San Francisco’s city-run benefits program “offer[ed] 
employers a meaningful alternative” to an ERISA plan and “provide[d] 
tangible benefits to employees when their employers [chose] to pay the 
City.”191 Employers who already offered health care benefits could keep their 
ERISA plans, and employers who did not could simply pay the tax and their 
employees could rely on the city program.192 Employers who relied on the city 
program would have a way to keep their employees healthy without the burden 
and complexity of selecting and administering their own ERISA plans. 
Pay-or-play laws thus survive or fail ERISA preemption based on the 
nature of the employer choices they establish and courts’ characterizations of 
them.193 Two years after the Golden Gate opinion, Congress enacted a federal-
level employer mandate in the Affordable Care Act, likely obviating the 
urgency for many more states to pursue pay-or-play regulations.194 
Massachusetts repealed its state employer mandate during the initial years of 
Affordable Care Act implementation.195 Some cities and counties, meanwhile, 
have continued to pursue expanded health care programs with some pay-or-
play features, likely designed with the Fielder–Golden Gate split in mind. For 
example, in 2016, the City of Seattle enacted a Golden Gate-style ordinance 
aimed at employer health care contributions for hotel workers.196 The ERISA 
Industry Committee has sued the City, relying on Fielder to argue that 
ERISA preempts the ordinance; the litigation remains ongoing.197 
Massachusetts revived its pay-or-play mandate in 2018, suggesting that the 
 
190 Id. at 659-60. 
191 Id. at 660. 
192 Id. 
193 See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1205-06. 
194 See Wiley, supra note 8, at 859 (“The [pay-or-play preemption] issue became moot when 
the ACA federalized the employer mandate, so the question remains unresolved.”). 
195 Benjamin D. Sommers, Mark Shepard & Katherine Hempstead, Why Did Employer 
Coverage Fall in Massachusetts After the ACA? Potential Consequences of a Changing Employer Mandate, 
37 HEALTH AFF. 1144, 1145 (2018). 
196 Carmen Castro-Pagan, Seattle Faces Legal Test Over Hotel Worker Insurance Mandate, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Aug. 14, 2018), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/employee-benefits/seattle-
faces-legal-test-over-hotel-worker-insurance-mandate [https://perma.cc/KKN8-9MD7]. 
197 Id.; see also, e.g., ERISA Indus. Comm. v. City of Seattle, No. 2:18-cv-01188, 2018 WL 
4237773 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 6, 2018). 
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preemption of pay-or-play provisions remains a relevant concern despite the 
ACA’s federal employer mandate.198 
The Supreme Court has not considered ERISA preemption in the pay-
or-play context, and litigation outcomes remain unpredictable when 
navigating the distinctions between the diverging circuit court opinions in 
Fielder and Golden Gate.199 The pair of cases has reverberated beyond the 
Fourth and Ninth Circuits. Other courts rely on Fielder and Golden Gate in a 
variety of ERISA contexts as exemplars of preempted and permitted 
employer incentives impacts, respectively.200 
3. Insurance Regulation Versus Self-Funded Plans 
ERISA’s express preemption provision contains an exception: a “savings” 
clause that saves from preemption state laws that regulate insurance.201 
However, the savings clause contains an exception-to-the-exception, the 
“deemer” clause, which has been interpreted to exempt self-funded employer 
plans from the state insurance regulations saved by the savings clause.202 The 
upshot of the convoluted interplay between ERISA’s savings and deemer 
clauses is that states may regulate so-called “fully insured” employee health 
plans, but self-funded plans are completely beyond the reach of state law. 
 
198 Katie Lannan, Mass. Employers Face New Health Care Assessments in 2018, WBUR: 
COMMONHEALTH (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2017/12/29/mass-
employers-face-new-health-care-assessments-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/P522-UT3J]. 
199 See, e.g., Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & Cty. of S.F., 558 F.3d 1000, 1004 (9th Cir. 
2009) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“Our decision in this case creates a 
circuit split . . . , renders meaningless the test the Supreme Court set out in Shaw . . ., conflicts with 
other Supreme Court cases . . ., and, most importantly, flouts the mandate of national uniformity in 
the area of employer-provided healthcare that underlies the enactment of ERISA.”); id. at 1001 
(Fletcher, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 
F.3d 180, 203 (4th Cir. 2007) (Michael, J., dissenting) (lamenting the inconsistency of ERISA 
preemption holdings); see also Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 411 (observing “the unfortunate 
reality that when it comes to ERISA preemption litigation, anything can happen”); Catherine L. 
Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal–Mart, 92 MINN. 
L. REV. 1502, 1514–20 (2008) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s majority analysis in Fielder is 
inconsistent with recent Supreme Court holdings in other ERISA preemption cases); Jacobson, 
supra note 146, at 95 (observing that “[a]s with the courts, health law commentators are split on 
whether pay-or-play laws are likely to survive an ERISA preemption challenge” before the 
Supreme Court). 
200 See, e.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 761 F.3d 631, 636 n.1 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(emphasizing that the state law in question was permissible because, unlike the law at issue in Fielder, 
it did not “force a plan to provide a certain level of benefits”), vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1355 (2016), aff ’d, 
827 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2016). 
201 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2018). 
202 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); see Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 
(1985) (explaining that the recognition of “a distinction between insured and uninsured 
plans . . . merely give[s] life to a distinction created by Congress in the ‘deemer clause’”). 
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ERISA’s savings clause preserves significant spheres of state regulatory 
authority over health insurance. The statute does not define “insurance,”203 
but under current ERISA precedent, it saves state laws that are “specifically 
directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and that “substantially affect 
the risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.”204 
Thus, employers who provide health benefits by buying insurance 
policies for their employees must abide by state health insurance regulations 
that govern those policies. This method of providing employee health 
benefits is known as a “fully-insured” plan because the employer purchases 
insurance policies for its employees from an insurance company, who takes 
on the contracted risks in exchange for premiums.205 For these fully insured 
plans, states retain broad authority to regulate. For example, state insurance 
rules prohibiting subrogation by health insurance plans affect employer 
plans’ calculation of benefits but nonetheless avoid preemption under the 
savings clause.206 States also can regulate the insurance policies available for 
purchase by employers. States may require that insurers cover certain 
services,207 set rules for underwriting and administration208 (such as mandatory 
open enrollment, community rating, and risk-pooling209), and require that 
insurers accept all providers willing to meet the plan’s terms (“any willing 
provider” laws).210 
Many employers, particularly larger employers, now offer health benefits 
a different way: they agree to pay for some portion of their employees’ health 
care needs directly from an employer fund, instead of purchasing insurance 
 
203 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“[N]othing in this subchapter shall be construed to 
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance.”), with id. § 1002 
(definitions section for Title 29 with no entry defining “insurance”). 
204 Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341-42 (2003). 
205 E.g., CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 175. 
206 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1990). 
207 See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731, 746-47 (1985) (holding 
that states may require specified mental-health-care benefits be provided to residents in certain 
employee health care plans). 
208 See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359, 370-87 (2002) (holding 
state law requiring external appeals process for benefit disputes was enforceable against HMO 
providing employer-sponsored coverage). 
209 See, e.g., Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that 
Wisconsin high-risk pool regulations were not preempted by ERISA); NYS Health Maintenance 
Org. Conference v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 803 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that New York’s community 
rating and open enrollment regulations were not preempted because their only connection to 
employer plans was an “indirect effect on rate diversification among insurers”). 
210 See Kentucky Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 337-39 (2003) (upholding 
state “any willing provider” law as within the “business of insurance” under ERISA); cf. Pharm. 
Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Tufte, 297 F. Supp. 3d 964, 982 (D.N.D. 2017) (holding that ERISA does not 
preempt state regulation of pharmacy benefit managers—insurance intermediaries engaged in the 
“business of insurance”); but cf. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(holding an Iowa law regulating pharmacy benefit managers to be preempted by ERISA). 
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policies for them.211 This form of employer-sponsored health benefit is known 
as “self-funded”212 or “self-insured,”213 with the “self” referring to the employer. 
In 2018, sixty-one percent of Americans with employer-sponsored health care 
coverage were covered by self-funded plans.214 By contrast, in the 1970s when 
ERISA was passed, only seven percent of those with employer-sponsored 
health coverage were in self-funded plans.215 Although the deemer clause does 
not mention self-funded plans, the Supreme Court has held that the self-
funding mechanism does not sufficiently replicate the “business of insurance” 
for the purpose of regulation, and thus states may not “deem” self-funded 
plans to be providing insurance for the purpose of regulating them.216 
This interpretation of ERISA’s savings and deemer clauses means states 
may enforce their insurance regulations against fully insured, but not self-
funded, employer-sponsored health plans.217 In essence, ERISA preemption 
catalyzed the growth of self-funded plans by opening a loophole through 
which employers could provide their employees with health benefits and 
avoid state insurance regulation.218 Further, courts have allowed employer 
plans to be “self-insured in name only, with the [employer] bearing minimal 
risk and most of the risk borne by the insurer” providing stop-loss coverage 
to the employer.219 
ERISA’s savings clause thus allows states to regulate forty percent of the 
employer-sponsored insurance market that is fully insured, but the deemer 
 
211 Self-Insured Group Health Plans, SELF-INS. INST. OF AM., INC., https://www.siia.org/
i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageID=4546 [https://perma.cc/96RL-XQCY] (last visited Oct. 19, 2019). 
212 CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 167. Employers often safeguard their funds by 
purchasing “stop loss” insurance, to protect them if their employees’ health care claims exceed the 
fund amount. See id. 
213 See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers Under the 
Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 539, 554-55 
(2013) (noting that no definition of “self-insured” was included in ERISA, but tracing definitions 
through the Internal Revenue Code and Affordable Care Act). 
214  CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 167. 
215 Borzi, supra note 23, at 661. 
216 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding that self-insured 
plans are exempt from state insurance regulation under the “deemer” clause). 
217 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (reading the deemer clause “to exempt 
self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of the saving 
clause,” and thus finding preempted a state antisubrogation law as it applied to self-funded plans). 
218 See Chirba-Martin & Brennan, supra note 126, at 146 (characterizing this loophole as 
“creat[ing] an almost irresistible incentive to employers to self-fund”); Jost & Hall, supra note 213, 
at 552-54 (providing an overview of the relationship between ERISA and self-insured plans); cf. 
Russell Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves Another”, 
5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 90 (2005) (proposing that regulators use a different 
“loophole” in the savings clause to “reduce the desirability to employers of exploiting the deemer 
clause loophole”). But see FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he 
number of self-insured employee benefit plans grew dramatically in the 1960’s and early 1970’s.”). 
219 Jost & Hall, supra note 213, at 554. 
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clause preempts the same state regulation as applied to the remaining sixty 
percent of employer self-funded plans.220 The diminishing practical 
distinction between fully insured and self-insured plans strains credulity.221 
Yet this technical distinction triggers ERISA preemption for self-funded 
plans and thereby frustrates state efforts to enact uniform health care 
reforms,222 as self-funded plans have swallowed the savings clause. 
ERISA thus painfully illustrates how indeterminate an express 
preemption provision can be, spawning a dense, shifting body of precedent 
with relatively little predictive value. 
B. State Single-Payer Plans Under ERISA 
The intricate threat of ERISA preemption appears to have informed state 
legislative drafting in the most recent waves of single-payer legislation.223 
Many provisions in the single-payer plans outlined in Part I fall well beyond 
ERISA’s preemptive reach because they address the state’s operation of its 
own plan and do not “relate to” employer-sponsored health plans, including 
the resident eligibility, cost-sharing, comprehensive coverage, and care 
coordination provisions.224 Similarly, the provider eligibility and rate-setting 
provisions, as well as rate setting for medical goods like prescription drugs, 
target core features of the health care market without regard to employer 
plans, and with permissibly tangential effects on them.225 They have strong 
 
220 See Korobkin, supra note 218, at 136. 
221 See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s construction of the 
statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded by the employer 
(self-insured plans) and those that are insured by regulated insurance companies (insured plans).”). 
222 See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 134, at 294 (“[W]hile ERISA itself does not require that 
employers establish employee health insurance plans, it does effectively preclude state statutes that 
would mandate such plans.”); see also Acs et al., supra note 142, at 267 (observing that ERISA “limits 
many of the health care financing and cost containment initiatives that states have considered,” and 
that “[b]ecause self-insured plans do not have to comply with state-mandated benefits, ERISA 
prevents states from legislating a minimum benefit package for all of their residents”). 
223 As detailed in Part I, supra, state single-payer plans establish broad eligibility and coverage 
rules, then employ one or more types of provisions to fund the plans and draw enrollees from private 
coverage into the plan. These provisions typically involve payroll and income taxes (Type A–
Funding Plans), restrictions on provider reimbursement outside the state plan (Type B–Provider 
Restrictions), and some means of recouping state-plan payments for those who continue to maintain 
employer coverage (Type C–Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-Payer). See supra Table 1.   
224 See supra Section I.A (listing examples of these common provisions); cf. Rush Prudential 
HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 359, 370-87 (2002) (holding state law dictating plan 
administration was enforceable against HMO providing employer-sponsored coverage); Metro. Life 
Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 727, 758 (1985) (holding state-mandated coverage of 
particular services, as applied to employer plans, not preempted as regulating insurance). 
225 See supra Section I.A (providing examples). 
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foundations in Supreme Court precedent226 and should easily survive 
litigation challenging them. 
The crucial provisions for capturing employer health care spending and 
moving employees onto the state single-payer plan, however, face a difficult 
path through the ERISA preemption labyrinth. As the analysis below 
concludes, the Type A, B, and C provisions should survive preemption under 
current ERISA doctrine and precedent. Yet the opaque nature of ERISA 
doctrine, courts’ unpredictable application of it, and employer trade 
associations’ propensity to sue also mean that litigation is virtually 
guaranteed, while the result in any particular litigation is not. 
1. Type A—Funding Plans 
State individual income taxes, meant to capture employees’ contributions 
to premiums and cost-sharing, do not trigger ERISA preemption because 
they do not target or impact employers. Employer payroll taxes also should 
easily survive preemption under Travelers. Payroll taxes keyed to employers’ 
health care expenditures, however, may need to navigate through the 
impenetrable hash of appellate precedent on pay-or-play laws, which obscures 
prediction. 
Although states enjoy fairly wide latitude on how they raise revenues, 
Type A’s payroll taxes ultimately could influence employers’ benefit decisions 
and therefore may run afoul of ERISA preemption. Assessments targeting 
particular employers and offering the employer nothing in return, as in 
Fielder,227 and/or setting the tax rate exorbitantly high228 may exert a 
preempted level of influence on the employer’s benefit plan decisions. On the 
other hand, laws that preserve discretion for employers on how to meet a 
required health care expenditure rate and that offer tangible options for 
employers that choose to pay instead of play, as in Golden Gate, create the 
kind of “legitimate alternative[s]” that survive preemption.229 
The payroll taxes in Funding Plans have several structural advantages over 
the pay-or-play assessments in Fielder and Golden Gate. First, payroll tax 
provisions do not depend on the existence or amount of employers’ health 
benefits and need not make any mention of them. Payroll taxes are calculated 
 
226 E.g., Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 337-39 (2003); De Buono v. 
NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 808-10, 816 (1997); Cal. Div. of Labor 
Standards Enf ’t v. Dillingham Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 329-30 (1997); N.Y. State 
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 659-65 (1995). 
227 See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 196 (4th Cir. 2007). 
228 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (speculating that “an exorbitant tax” might leave employers 
“with a Hobson’s choice,” but holding that the tax at issue was not exorbitant). 
229 See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 660-61 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
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as a percentage of the wages paid to employees.230 The lack of an explicit 
reference to employer plans, and the fact that the tax is assessed without 
regard to existing ERISA plans or plan choices helps legislation of Type A 
pass through ERISA preemption’s first “relates to” hurdle.231 
Second, a payroll tax is far less likely than a pay-or-play assessment to 
have an impermissible “connection” to ERISA plans via its indirect economic 
effects on employers’ decisions whether to offer health benefits.232 In 
Travelers, the Supreme Court posited that ERISA would preempt a 
hypothetical state law that did not directly regulate ERISA plans, but still 
“produce[d] such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects . . . as to force an 
ERISA plan[’s]” choice of substantive coverage or source of insurance.233 This 
hypothesis may guide states’ calculation of the amount of a payroll tax: Set 
the payroll tax too low, and employers may still want to provide health 
benefits to attract employees. This could preserve a “meaningful choice” for 
employers, as in Golden Gate, but may compete with the state’s plan and erode 
the goals of a single-payer system.234 A higher payroll tax should make it less 
rational for an employer to continue to offer its own health benefits and pay 
the tax, though still should not run afoul of ERISA preemption by its indirect 
economic effects. At some point, a payroll tax could become so “exorbitant” 
as to leave only a “Hobson’s choice,” but the Supreme Court has yet to define 
that point and the state single-payer laws surveyed here do not appear to 
approach it.235 
For courts still tempted to find preemption of the indirect incentives of a 
payroll tax, Type A’s establishment of a state health insurance program should 
help such taxes survive preemption under the reasoning of Golden Gate and 
Fielder. While Maryland’s pay-or-play law created only one “rational” 
choice for employers because the “pay” option still left their employees 
without insurance,236 the establishment of a public insurance program in 
 
230 See Brittain, supra note 61, at 110. 
231 See Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (warning that laws may “relate to” ERISA plans if they “act[] 
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or if “the existence of ERISA plans is essential to 
the law’s operation.”); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (using “reference to” as one definition of “relates to” 
(quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983)). 
232 Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 146-48 (2001); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. 
233 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. The Supreme Court in Travelers speculated that an “exorbitant” 
tax would force a Hobson’s choice, but upheld a less-than-exorbitant one. Id. at 664. 
234 Payroll taxes are all pay—the choice is either pay or pay-and-play. The employer pays the 
state fund either way. 
235 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650, 664 (upholding a state surcharge of up to twenty-four percent 
on commercial insurance claims paid to hospitals). 
236 Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 193 (4th Cir. 2007). The Fourth Circuit 
apparently ignored the fact that many Walmart employees would be eligible for Medicaid. 
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Golden Gate created the “meaningful alternative” essential to the pay-or-
play law’s survival.237 
The Type A payroll tax has a third advantage over pay-or-play laws, which 
is that it is not tied to any particular benefit levels or coverage decisions by 
employers.238 Circuit courts have upheld taxes of general applicability with 
indirect impacts on employer choices.239 And the ordinance in Golden Gate 
dictated that employers spend a certain amount on employee health care, 
allowed them to satisfy their expenditure by offering benefits, and gave them 
wide discretion about how to do so if they chose. The Type A payroll tax does 
even less nudging than the Golden Gate ordinance because it does not dictate 
that employers spend funds on employees at all. The payroll tax would thus 
have little or no impact on decisions about covered services, funding levels, 
or plan administration. 
Last, the payroll tax enjoys some advantage because it does not impose 
additional administrative or compliance burdens on employers or their 
ERISA plans. Instead, it might actually relieve some existing burdens. If an 
employer chooses to offer benefits and pay the tax, its benefits plan would not 
be subject to any additional compliance requirements in the single-payer 
state. If an employer chooses to pay the tax and drop coverage, it sheds some 
existing compliance burdens under both ERISA and state laws. Reliance on 
a state program in one state creates “disuniformity” for multistate employers’ 
benefit plans, but does so in a way that would ease the employers’ burdens in 
the single-payer state, furthering a “primary objective” of ERISA to minimize 
administrative burden.240 Concerns for nationwide uniformity and multistate 
 
237 Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 660-61 (9th 
Cir. 2008). 
238 State taxes specifically targeting employee benefit plans or based on the value of benefits 
provided by a plan have been invalidated. See Birdsong v. Olson, 708 F. Supp. 792, 798-99 (W.D. 
Tex. 1989) (determining that a state tax on the insurance company administrative fees for ERISA 
plans was preempted); National Carriers’ Conference Comm. v. Heffernan, 454 F. Supp. 914, 915, 
918 (D. Conn. 1978) (finding that ERISA preempted state law imposing tax on employers 
maintaining employee benefit plans, based on the amount of benefits the employers paid annually). 
But see Gen. Motors Corp. v. Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(holding a premium tax on insurance companies, which included ERISA plans, not preempted under 
the savings clause). 
239 E.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 553, 557-558 (6th Cir. 2016) 
(holding that Michigan’s one–percent tax on all “paid claims” by “carriers” or “third party 
administrators” for services rendered was not preempted because the tax “does not directly regulate 
any integral aspects of ERISA.”). 
240 See Fielder, 475 F.3d at 191 (describing uniformity and minimizing administrative burden 
as ERISA’s “primary objective[s]”); see also Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 
(1985) (explaining that ERISA’s savings clause inevitably embraces state-by-state “disuniformities”); 
cf. FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (“To require plan providers to design their 
programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate the administration of 
nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset with decreased benefits.”). 
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compliance burdens helped doom the pay-or-play law in Fielder, the 
antisubrogation laws in FMC Corp., and the all-payer claims database in 
Gobeille, while Golden Gate found that some light recordkeeping and reporting 
did not rise to the level of concern.241 
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]ny state tax, or other law, that 
increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some 
effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean 
that every state law with such an effect is preempted by the federal statute.”242 
Despite strong arguments that a general payroll tax preserves employer 
discretion and decreases the burdens of providing benefits, its underlying 
intent to nudge employers to drop coverage in favor of the state’s single-payer 
plan means that states should expect litigation challenges. The actual outcome 
of those challenges, especially in circuits other than the Fourth and Ninth,243 
remains difficult to predict. 
2. Type B—Provider Restriction 
State laws that channel all payments to providers through the single-payer 
entity likewise should survive preemption, though their operation still raises 
some ERISA preemption concerns. Type B legislation restricts providers 
from accepting payment from any third parties other than the state 
program.244 These provider restrictions avoid explicit “reference to” employer 
insurance245 and by targeting providers, rather than employers, situate 
themselves in the realm of provider regulation that typically avoids ERISA 
preemption.246 
 
241 See Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 645, 657 (noting that employers providing self-funded health 
plans could use an average expenditure rate and not track actual per-employee spending, and that 
the ordinance’s recordkeeping and inspection requirements did not create conflicting directives that 
would burden employers or their plans because those recordkeeping requirements exist regardless 
of the ordinance). But see Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943-45 (2016) (holding 
claims data reporting requirements preempted even though self-funded plan administrators already 
collected the required data). 
242 De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 816 (1997). 
243 And probably the Sixth, too. See Self-Ins. Inst., 827 F.3d at 553-54 (affirming, after a remand 
for reconsideration in light of Gobeille, the dismissal of a challenge to Michigan’s payroll tax and the 
associated reporting requirements). 
244 See supra subsection I.B.2. The Type B proposals commonly contain an exception for federal 
programs that lack an approved waiver. 
245 See N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 656 (1995) (explaining that a “reference to” an ERISA plan can constitute an impermissible 
“relat[ion] to” ERISA (quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983) (quotation 
marks omitted))). 
246 See, e.g., De Buono, 520 U.S. at 813-16; Cal. Div. of Labor Standards Enf ’t v. Dillingham 
Constr., N.A., Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 329 (1997); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-64; cf. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. 
Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 790–92 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the Medicare Act did not preempt a state 
law prohibiting balance billing because provider regulation is traditionally a state concern). 
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A provider restriction would, by design, have an indirect influence on 
ERISA plans because those plans would no longer be able to find a network 
of providers who could accept their reimbursement. Whether this influence 
crosses the preemptive coercion line from Travelers and De Buono247 will 
determine the preemption question. Prohibiting providers from accepting 
reimbursement from commercial payers, including employer plans, should 
effectively force employers to drop coverage,248 or at least to make major 
modifications in how they administer their plans.249 The shift wrought by the 
provider restriction could invite litigation based on the murky precedent on 
what constitutes an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans. The most 
logical reading of provider restrictions, however, is that they avoid ERISA 
preemption by targeting providers. 
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary-Payer 
The addition of a subrogation, assignment, or secondary-payer provision, 
typically included in Type C legislation, mitigates the state law’s coercive 
impact by giving the employer plan a way to exist, funneling the plan’s 
reimbursements through the state single-payer entity. Although mostly 
similar in function, subrogation may prove slightly more suspect than 
assignment or secondary-payer provisions due to some tricky precedent.250 
None of the Type C provisions changes the amount the employer plan 
will spend on claims—by design, they maintain employer plans’ existing 
calculation of benefits.251 Secondary-payer provisions also do not alter the 
process of payment, while subrogation and assignment provisions merely 
redirect the existing payments from providers to the state single-payer entity. 
Type C provisions thus minimize the impact on claims payment, though they 
 
247 See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-64; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 813-16. 
248 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. 
249 See Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 148 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempts state laws 
that “govern[] . . . a central matter of plan administration” or “interfere[] with nationally uniform 
plan administration”). 
250 See id. at 147 (holding that the “payment of benefits [is] a central matter of plan 
administration” and a state law requiring plan administrators to go beyond the plan documents to 
determine beneficiaries is a preempted burden); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1990) 
(holding that a state law prohibiting insurer subrogation from a tort claimant’s recovery was “related 
to” employer plans because it would interfere with the plan’s usual financial calculations in that state 
and “frustrate plan administrators’ continuing obligation to calculate uniform benefit levels 
nationwide,” and holding further that ERISA’s savings clause saved the state antisubrogation law 
only with respect to fully insured plans because it “directly control[led] the terms of insurance 
contracts”). 
251 See, e.g., FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61. 
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pose some preemption risk because claim payment is a sacred and “central 
matter of plan administration.”252 
In Egelhoff, for example, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted 
a state probate statute automatically assigning a beneficiary after divorce 
because the law created too much of an administrative burden on multistate 
employers.253 The majority in Egelhoff was particularly concerned that because 
of the state law, “[p]lan administrators cannot make payments simply by” 
reading the plan documents, but rather had to “familiarize themselves with 
state statutes” to determine whether state law had “revoked” the status of the 
plan’s named beneficiary.254 
The secondary-payer provisions in Type C preserve the status quo of 
claim payment for employers who choose to continue offering benefits and 
therefore do not implicate ERISA. The subrogation and assignment 
provisions in the Type C category in some circumstances redirect payments 
from an ERISA plan and therefore could invite litigation, though they, too, 
ought to survive preemption challenges under the logic of Supreme Court 
precedent. Type C provisions do not intrude on any provisions in ERISA 
plan documents as between the plan and its beneficiaries—they primarily 
govern the relationship between the single-payer plan and the individual, 
allowing the single payer to assert the individual’s right to payment for 
covered services.255 They do not, therefore, “bind[] plan administrators to a 
particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status,” as the law found 
preempted in Egelhoff had.256 If, however, an ERISA plan contains a provision 
prohibiting the beneficiary from assigning rights, several courts of appeals 
recently held these clauses enforceable, despite the fact that ERISA itself 
“does not provide clear guidance” on the issue.257 
 
252 See Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 945 (2016) (holding that a state regime 
for reporting details of claim information “intrudes upon ‘a central matter of plan administration’” 
and therefore was preempted (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148)); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 
482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987) (recognizing that “making disbursements” is central to plan administration). But 
cf. S. 631, 78th Leg. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess. § 15(2), (3) (Or. 2015) (explicitly referencing employer 
plans in subrogating the state entity “to the rights of any participant that has a claim against an . . . 
employer, third party administrator, . . . or any other person that may be liable for the cost of health 
services provided to the participant”). 
253 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148-49, 150. 
254 Id. at 148-49. 
255 Cf. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 
645, 661, 662, 664 (1995) (reasoning that a state law with indirect economic effects is not preempted 
when “[s]uch state laws leave plan administrators right where they would be in any case”). 
256 Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147. 
257 Univ. Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., 774 F. App’x 60, 63 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Am. Orthopedic 
& Sports Med. v. Indep. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890 F.3d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 2018)); see also Dialysis 
Newco, Inc. v. Cmty. Health Sys. Grp. Health Plan, 938 F.3d 246, 260 (5th Cir. 2019). Note also 
that subrogation does not create a preempted state remedy under ERISA’s § 502, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) 
(2018), the statutory section including an integrated enforcement mechanism that the Supreme 
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Further obscuring the arguments, the Supreme Court has opined that 
ERISA does not preempt minimal burdens imposed on plan administration 
by the need to review different state law requirements.258 But it has not 
clarified principles for triviality, which invites litigation. Type C’s assignment 
and subrogation provisions will redirect ERISA plan payments, but whether 
they may do so without significantly burdening plan administration in the 
eyes of a court remains unclear. 
Ultimately, the combination of the features of Types A, B, and C, like in 
Ohio’s bill,259 creates an even more “meaningful alternative” or “legitimate 
choice” for employers in the single-payer system. The existence of the 
subrogation mechanism in the unified provider-payment system opens an 
avenue for employers to maintain their plans’ relationships with providers, as 
well as to make use of the state plan infrastructure supported by the payroll 
tax revenue. Further, combining the tax in Type A with a Type B provider-
payment system enables a state to achieve the desired results with a lower tax 
rate. The lower the tax rate, the less likely it will be held to be “exorbitant” 
and therefore preemptively coercive of employer benefits decisions.260 At a 
lower tax rate, an employer could rationally choose to both pay the tax and 
continue offering its ERISA plan. 
While the arguments against preemption for subrogation, assignment, 
and secondary-payer provisions are the stronger ones, the impenetrable pile 
of ERISA precedents and courts’ difficulty applying them frustrate 
predictability, while fueling litigation. 
4. Nonduplication Provisions 
Many of the bills of all three types contain nonduplication provisions 
prohibiting insurers from offering state-plan-covered health benefits. These 
backstop provisions are intended to remove commercial competitors to the 
single-payer plan benefits and permit insurers only to offer “wraparound” 
 
Court has held completely preempts parallel state remedies. See, e.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 
542 U.S. 200, 208-09 (2004). ERISA does not address the assignment of beneficiaries’ claims and 
the use of a state subrogation provision in these circumstances does not create inconsistencies with 
ERISA’s underlying policies. See, e.g., Brown v. Am. Int’l Life Assur. Co. of N.Y., 778 F. Supp. 912, 
917 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (explaining that courts should develop federal common law of ERISA with 
the aid of state law, as long as state law is consistent with ERISA’s goals). 
258 E.g., De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997) 
(explaining that “‘myriad state laws’ of general applicability . . . impose some burdens on the 
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them” to trigger preemption 
(quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668)); Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151 (debating whether an administrative 
burden was “trivial” or preempted). 
259 H.R. 440, 132d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2017); see also supra note 95 and 
accompanying text. 
260 De Buono, 520 U.S. at 814-15; Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664. 
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services that supplement the single payer’s coverage. Nonduplication 
provisions directly target insurers, rather than employers, but have the 
intended effect of eliminating employer-based coverage and shifting covered 
employees to the single-payer plan. Employers still could choose to self-fund 
health insurance for their employees, or to rely on the state plan and offer 
wraparound insurance as a benefit. Like other types of insurance regulation, 
the preemption analysis of states’ nonduplication provisions would diverge 
for fully insured and self-funded plans. 
Assuming a court would find nonduplication provisions have an 
impermissible connection to employer-sponsored insurance, ERISA’s savings 
clause would restore the nonduplication provision for those employers 
offering fully insured health benefits. To avoid preemption, a state law must 
(1) be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance, and (2) 
substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between insurer and 
insured.261 The nonduplication provisions impose prohibitions on insurers, 
satisfying the first requirement. The prohibition on covering state-plan 
services and benefits substantially affects the risk-pooling arrangement by 
removing the state-plan services from coverable risks. The only risks an 
insurer may cover under nonduplication are those wraparound services not 
covered by the state plan. While nonduplication provisions prohibit coverage, 
the savings clause logic saves them in precisely the same way that laws 
requiring coverage or underwriting have been saved.262 As long as state 
regulation of the insurance industry affects risk-pooling, it does not matter 
whether the law expands or contracts risks in the pool. 
As to self-funded plans, however, the nonduplication provision would 
remain preempted and therefore ineffective. For example, California’s S.B. 
562 contained a nonduplication provision that prohibited “carriers” from 
offering coverage for services that are covered under the state’s single payer 
plan.263 The bill’s definition of “carrier” included insurers licensed by the 
state’s insurance department and “health care service plans” as defined under 
the state’s managed care law, the Knox-Keene Act.264 Prior cases have held 
that the Knox-Keene Act’s regulation of “health care service plans” is 
preempted by ERISA with respect to self-funded employer plans.265 With 
existing precedent carving self-funded employee health benefit plans from 
 
261 Ky. Ass’n of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334-39 (2003). 
262 See id. at 336 n.1; Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002); Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 729-32, 740-47 (1985); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass’n v. 
Tufte, 297 F. Supp. 3d 964, 981-82 (D.N.D. 2017). 
263 S. 562, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2 (Cal. 2017) (§ 100612(g)). 
264 Id. (§ 100602(f)). 
265 E.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1295-96, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977), 
aff ’d, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978). 
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California’s definition of a “health care service plan,” S.B. 562’s 
nonduplication provision for health care service plans would also be 
inapplicable to self-funded ERISA plans. 
The application of the deemer clause means that employers could offer 
self-funded benefit plans that duplicate the state single-payer plan, as well as 
covering additional services. If employers chose to continue self-funding 
under the state single-payer system, preemption would keep this significant 
segment of lower-risk people out of the state plan’s risk pool, threatening its 
sustainability.266 Because of ERISA preemption, nonduplication provisions 
will not work to move self-funded employers to the single-payer plan. Thus, 
states must turn to other tools, such as the payroll taxes in Type A or the 
provider restrictions in Type B to make the choice to self-fund benefits 
offered by the state plan considerably less attractive to employers, yet this 
meaningful choice would remain available in both theory and reality. 
*   *   * 
Types A, B, and C logically should survive preemption, and 
nonduplication provisions may be preempted only as to self-funded plans. 
But the muddle of ERISA jurisprudence renders actual outcomes uncertain. 
The only certainty in ERISA preemption is that there will be litigation. 
C. Drafting ERISA-Resistant Single-Payer Legislation 
A state single-payer proposal’s ability to survive an ERISA preemption 
challenge is an important consideration for financing the single-payer plan, 
as well as for achieving the solidarity aims of single-payer coverage. The most 
ERISA-resistant single-payer program would contain all three elements 
described above: (A) a funding plan; (B) a provider restriction; and (C) an 
assignment, subrogation, and/or secondary-payer provision. The more 
diversified or redundant the state’s portfolio of policy tools to achieve single-
payer, the more resistant it may be to challenges to any one of the provisions. 
 
266 Cf. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care Reform by 
Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 146-53 (2011) (explaining how even employers with 
large-group plans can engage in risk selection among employees). See generally EMPLOYMENT AND 
HEALTH BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 168 (Marilyn J. Field & Harold T. Shapiro eds., 
1993) (“In general, because large employers almost universally provide health benefits and have more 
predictable costs, large groups present fewer problems with risk selection than either individuals or 
small groups.”). 
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States would be well served to exclude any explicit references to 
employers’ benefit plans in their employer-contribution provisions,267 but 
courts ultimately will judge state efforts on how they impact ERISA plans.268 
A funding plan combining payroll and income taxes captures employer 
expenditures and individual spending, which provides incentives for both 
employers and employees to drop their employer-based coverage in favor of 
single-payer coverage. Payroll taxes should not be preempted by ERISA, but 
courts have reached contradictory conclusions, which invite litigation. By 
combining individual income taxes, which are never preempted, with payroll 
taxes, state single-payer plans can set a lower payroll tax rate more likely to 
survive challenge. 
Provider-restriction provisions create additional incentives for employees 
to drop their employer-plans by shrinking the network of participating 
providers in employer-based plans. ERISA generally does not preempt 
provider regulation, even if it has indirect effects on employee benefit 
plans.269 Compared with nonduplication provisions prohibiting the sale or 
offer of coverage that duplicates benefits covered by the single payer, a 
provider restriction is less likely to be preempted with respect to self-funded 
ERISA plans. If they survive, provider restrictions could fill an important 
gap created by ERISA preemption of nonduplication provisions, shrinking 
consumers’ demand for employer-based plans and creating incentives for 
participation in the single-payer plan. 
A provider restriction becomes more powerful when paired with an 
assignment/subrogation/secondary-payer provision to allow the single payer 
to capture additional employer and other third-party-payer expenditures by 
seeking reimbursement for claims paid by the single payer for patients with 
dual coverage.270 There are strong arguments that the way 
assignment/subrogation/secondary-payer provisions work in the single-payer 
context would not be preempted by ERISA.271 Thus, pairing a Type B 
(Provider Restriction) provision with a Type C (Assignment/Subrogation/
Secondary-Payer) provision would create additional mechanisms beyond tax 
incentives to pull individuals into the single-payer plan and to capture third-
 
267 See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Greater Wash. Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) 
(holding D.C. law specifically referring to ERISA-regulated employee benefit plans preempted 
“on that basis alone”). 
268 E.g., Cal. Div. of Labor Standard Enf ’t v. Dillingham, 519 U.S. 316, 328 (1997) (holding 
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ERISA plans). 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 147–154. 
270 See supra notes 81–98; text accompanying notes 81–89. 
271 See supra notes 249–258 and accompanying text. 
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party expenditures, both of which would be resistant to ERISA 
preemption.272 
A state may want to pursue an A-B-C, belt-and-suspenders approach to 
increase the overall durability of the plan through diversification of policy 
tools. For example, having elements of Type B and Type C provisions could 
preserve the single-payer system even if a Type A payroll tax is preempted 
by ERISA.273 If a court erroneously invalidated a payroll tax, a severability 
provision in the state statute might permit conversion of the state’s 
mandatory single-payer payroll tax into a pay-or-play option, like the San 
Francisco ordinance upheld in Golden Gate.274 Under those circumstances, a 
state with a pay-or-play payroll tax would be better off if it also has a provider 
restriction and a subrogation/assignment/secondary-payer provision, because 
the latter elements could take on more of the work of pulling enrollees and 
employer expenditures into the single-payer system. In a pay-or-play system, 
many more employers and employees would likely retain their employer-
based coverage, so the incentives created by the Type B and C elements would 
become more critical to creating a broad and unified single-payer system. 
Given the tenuousness of the politics of establishing a single-payer 
system, a state legislature may be interested in building a redundant system, 
utilizing an A-B-C approach, that can continue to stand even if preemption 
erodes one mechanism to move money or enrollees into the system. The 
legislature may be better able to patch or fix a system that continues to 
function, even in a diminished form, rather than return to the voters and the 
floor of the chamber to design a new single-payer system from scratch. It is 
better to build a durable program that can withstand some degree of attack, 
letting the endowment effect of newly acquired benefits take hold to protect 
the system from political repeal in the face of a challenge.275 
III. ERISA REFORM AS HEALTH REFORM 
The recent wave of state single-payer legislation painfully illustrates how 
ERISA preemption—and the uncertainty that swirls around it—undercuts 
states’ potential role in health reform. This project focuses on state single-
payer bills as emblematic of the kind of bold experimentation and testing 
 
272 See supra text accompanying notes 94–95. 
273 We think this is the wrong result, as explained above, but ERISA jurisprudence is nothing 
if not incoherent and unpredictable. 
274 See supra text accompanying notes 178–191. 
275 See, e.g., Erin C. Fuse Brown, Developing a Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. 
& TECH. 439, 481-85 (2013) (explaining the anticipated operation of the endowment effect, in the 
context of the ACA). 
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ground often associated with state law in a federal system,276 and on ERISA 
preemption’s subversion of that role. Over the past fifty years, federal health 
care statutes have established a regulatory infrastructure with baseline 
protections and federal funding sources, inviting states to participate in 
implementation and experimentation.277 ERISA, meanwhile, prohibits state 
experiments largely without substituting a comprehensive federal scheme for 
employer-sponsored health benefits, leaving a regulatory void. 
ERISA preemption sets a federalism trap that can derail ambitious state 
reforms—particularly those state reforms focused on universal coverage and 
cost control. After exposing the trap, we propose four potential federal 
reforms to ERISA that would pave the way for meaningful state health 
reform within the federal system. 
A. The Federalism Trap 
Volumes have been written about the role of federalism in health care.278 
The debates often conceive of a scale of power between states at one pole and 
the federal government at the other and focus on determining either the 
optimal balance point between the poles or what legal or policy structures 
promote or inhibit federalism’s various goals.279 This Article sidesteps those 
federalism questions, and instead starts with an assumption that some degree 
of health care federalism—a division of power between the federal 
government and the states—is desirable to achieve health policy goals, 
whether they are increasing coverage, controlling costs, improving quality, or 
broader equitable aims.280 Federalism can improve policy by allowing states 
to innovate, test, and learn from experimental models.281 Federalism also can 
 
276 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Health Care For?, 70 
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281 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing states as laboratories for experimentation). 
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enhance democratic goals of self-governance, divided power, pluralism, and 
government responsiveness.282 
In health care, there are numerous political, economic, and historical 
reasons to prefer federal reforms. Politically, state “health reform” cuts both 
ways—some states aim for universal coverage and patient protections, others 
pass health laws restricting access, perpetuating discrimination, and 
responding to inaccurate assumptions.283 Though federal legislation is not 
inherently prone to protecting access, federal baseline protections can guard 
against discrimination and codify evidence-based solutions, counteracting 
local prejudices.284 Economically, federal reforms enjoy the advantages of 
economies of scale and deficit spending, as well as cost-control power in 
interstate markets.285 Historically, the decades before the ACA witnessed the 
widespread failure of state regulation to rein in costs and expand access to 
care, with the exception of Massachusetts’s bold universal coverage 
experiment and a handful of other state reforms.286 The ACA then built 
comprehensive federal reforms on the results of Massachusetts’s 
experiment.287 The decade since the ACA’s enactment has also witnessed 
some of federalism’s pitfalls, as a shift in the federal Executive has 
undermined the ACA’s core protections and encouraged states to pursue 
variations that contradict the purposes of federal laws, while receiving 
funding provided by those laws.288 
So, without deciding where the balance between state and federal 
authority should lie, we accept that some level of power-sharing between 
states and the federal government is normatively desirable, both as an 
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instrumental means to improve health of the population and as a democratic 
ideal of diffusion of power and allowing diversity of policy solutions to reflect 
a diversity of political preferences. 
This project’s central federalism concern is that ERISA is an extremely 
antifederalist statute,289 which contravenes nearly all federal health care 
statutes by not allowing for state flexibility, variation, or indeed any state 
regulation of self-funded ERISA plans.290 In health care regulation, ERISA 
is an interloper. ERISA was not originally intended to target health care, but 
the expansion of employer-sponsored health benefits to reach forty-nine 
percent of the U.S. population has wrought unintended consequences.291 
Most federal statutes that intentionally regulate health care coverage, like 
Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA, contain provisions that enable states to 
pursue policy experiments, while ERISA does not.292 For example, Medicare 
heavily favors federal control without obstructing states’ interests.293 By 
contrast, ERISA is both heavily federal and largely deregulatory for health 
care benefits,294 so the balance is struck not in favor of federal regulation over 
state regulation, but in favor of deregulation over state regulation. 
Indeed, as interpreted by the courts, ERISA preemption places self-
funded employer plans beyond the reach of all manner of state health 
regulation: not just those that seek to mandate health benefits, but also 
reforms that seek to increase health coverage, to control health care costs, or 
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even to seek information about health care prices.295 While the rest of the 
federal health law infrastructure invites some level of state regulation, ERISA 
obstructs the potential benefits of state experimentation and policy diversity. 
States that seek to enact reforms to expand access or rein in their health care 
costs are needlessly hamstrung because ERISA preemption places a large 
portion of the market entirely beyond their regulatory reach.296 ERISA 
preempts state reforms without regard to policy or party—if, for example, a 
state wanted to pass a law prohibiting employers from offering contraceptive 
coverage, ERISA would preempt that, too. But ERISA preemption’s effects 
have a lopsided impact on state efforts aimed at expanding access to 
insurance. 
One risk of ERISA’s federalism trap is regulatory failure for health care—
particularly stasis and a system that fails to reflect the preferences of the 
states’ citizens.297 If the federal government fails to act, ERISA’s broad 
preemption means the states cannot step in to solve the problem. Broad 
federal preemption eliminates beneficial institutional diversity from 
federalism: “[i]f one set of regulators fails to address the problem, another set 
provides an alternative avenue for relief.”298 
Further, ERISA preemption doctrine’s elevation of the 1974 Congress’s 
concern for multistate employers and interstate commerce have had the effect 
in health reform of elevating the interests of private employers above those 
of a sovereign state: in essence, placing Walmart’s preferences above 
California’s and giving private businesses the power to veto state laws in the 
absence of congressional action.299 
 
295 See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s Impediment to State Health 
Reform, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 6 (2018). 
296 See Borzi, supra note 23, at 661 (noting that even as of the 1990s, “about half of covered 
workers were in self-insured plans, beyond the reach of state insurance regulators”); Parmet, supra 
note 278, at 135-36 (noting that ERISA’s preference for interstate uniformity and antiregulatory bias 
creates doubt as to the viability of state single-payer health reform). Note, however, that many other 
forces complicate states’ ability to achieve these goals, such as the federal tax preference given to 
employer-sponsored health insurance and many states’ inability to deficit-spend in times of recession 
due to balanced-budget laws. See TIMOTHY STOLTZFUS JOST, DISENTITLEMENT?: THE THREATS 
FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH-CARE PROGRAMS AND A RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSE 78-80 
(2003); Bagley, supra note 8, at 10-11. 
297 See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the Floor/Ceiling 
Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1576 (2007) (noting that, with regard to “broad federal 
preemption,” “recent ceiling preemption assertions create heightened risks of dysfunction and stasis”). 
298 Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 344 (William W. 
Buzbee, ed., 2009); see also Buzbee, supra note 297, at 1576 (critiquing “broad federal preemption” 
for how it “displaces multilayered institutional arrangements offering different actors, venues, and 
modalities for addressing a social problem”). 
299 Broad schemes of federal preemption tend to benefit the deregulated industry while 
sacrificing the preferences of states. See Buzbee, supra note 297, at 1590-92. Congress could, of course, 
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The common policy justification for ERISA’s sweeping preemption is that 
nationally uniform employee benefit rules enable multistate employers to 
offer health coverage.300 But this emphasis on national uniformity is 
overblown and outdated. As Justice Blackmun recognized in Metropolitan Life 
Insurance Co., state-by-state disuniformities “are the inevitable result of the 
congressional decision to ‘save’ local insurance regulation.”301 ERISA’s 
legislative history does not indicate that Congress intended total national 
uniformity for health benefit plans, or for multistate employers to defeat this 
traditional area of state regulation for such a broad swath of the population.302 
To the extent that Congress thought about health benefit plans at all when it 
drafted ERISA, it would have assumed that the vast majority of employers 
would continue to use fully insured plans and be subject to varying state 
insurance laws under the savings clause.303 Over time, interpretations of the 
deemer clause have left almost thirty percent of the population’s health 
coverage untouchable by state laws, including state health reforms.304 
Just as the 1974 Congress did not contemplate the exemption of self-
funded employer health plans when it passed ERISA, it likewise responded 
to very different employer incentives to provide health benefits in the first 
place. In the past four decades, the ACA’s national employer mandate, the 
creation of a sizeable tax-break for employers’ health benefits, and shifting 
labor market demands cast doubt on the assumption that employers will 
abandon health coverage in response to state regulations.305 Further, many 
 
remedy these failings by imposing federal regulations. Thus subsequent Congresses should share 
some of the blame for this failure. 
300 Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to provide any health benefit 
plan under ERISA . . . . [The state law] provisions could create a disincentive to the formation of 
employee health benefit plans, a problem that Congress addressed by making ERISA’s remedial 
scheme exclusive and uniform.”). 
301 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985). 
302 See, e.g., Bogan, supra note 291, at 952-53, 964-65; Borzi, supra note 23, at 663; see also FMC 
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65-66 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Had Congress intended [to 
preempt regulation of self-funded plans], it could have stated simply that ‘all State laws are pre-
empted insofar as they relate to any [self-funded] employee plan.’”). 
303 See Borzi, supra note 23, at 661 (“[E]ven if some in Congress had thought about [ERISA’s] 
effect on health plans, they probably would have believed that the insurance savings clause in 
ERISA’s preemption provisions would have been sufficient to address any future problems.”). 
304 For the statistic that 49% of the population has employer-sponsored coverage, see Health 
Insurance Coverage, supra note 9. For the observation that 61% of those with employer-sponsored 
coverage are in self-funded plans, see CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 54, at 167. So 49% * 61% = 29.89% 
of the U.S. population. 
305 See, e.g., Michelle Long et al., Trends in Employer-Sponsored Insurance Offer and Coverage 
Rates, 1999–2014, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.kff.org/private-
insurance/issue-brief/trends-in-employer-sponsored-insurance-offer-and-coverage-rates-1999-
2014 [https://perma.cc/Z7X7-AV2H] (observing that the percentage of the population covered by 
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single-state and small firms self-fund to take advantage of the regulatory 
vacuum without any claim to the advantages of multistate uniformity.306 
In sum, ERISA elevates the convenience of employers over state 
sovereignty and sacrifices the federalism benefits of states as engines of policy 
innovation.307 The upshot of courts’ voluminous and tortured ERISA 
preemption jurisprudence is that ERISA is so concerned with shielding 
multistate employers from having to comply with fifty states’ employee 
benefit regulations that it is willing to trade away the ability of a sovereign 
state to shape the health care system for its millions of citizens. 
B. Clearing a Path for State Health Reform 
ERISA preemption is a federal problem that demands a federal solution 
to clear the way for meaningful state health reforms. We explore four possible 
solutions targeting health benefits—three legislative and one jurisprudential. 
First, Congress could replace ERISA’s broad “any and all” preemption with 
conventional “floor preemption,” congruent with other federal health care 
statutes. Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s deemer clause for health 
benefit plans to remove the impenetrable barrier of preemption that currently 
shields self-funded employer-based plans from any state health regulation. 
Third, Congress could add a statutory waiver provision to ERISA that would 
allow states to apply to the federal government for approval to deviate from 
federal requirements in provision of health coverage. Fourth, as a fallback 
option if the first three legislative solutions are unavailing, courts could curtail 
the scope of ERISA preemption and reinvigorate the “presumption against 
preemption” for state authority over health care regulation in a way that is 
closer to Congress’s original legislative intent for ERISA. The first solution, 
 
employer-sponsored insurance had declined since 1999, but offering several potential causes for 
that decrease). 
306 See, e.g., Jan Greene, Even Small Employers Are Striking Out on Their Own, MANAGED CARE 
MAG. (May 28, 2019), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2019/6/even-small-employers-
are-striking-out-their-own [https://perma.cc/69PW-XB9P]. Indeed, because of the ready availability 
of stop-loss insurance, smaller employers can self-fund for an extremely narrow band of risk, in 
order to take advantage of the deemer clause. Id. 
307 There are critiques of the “state sovereignty” account of federalism. However, even critics 
acknowledge that states play a key democratic role in today’s federalism. For example, Heather 
Gerken observes: 
The state’s democratic role is just as important as its regulatory one. To be sure, states 
aren’t independent mini-polities, resolving their own questions entirely as they see fit. 
But they aren’t just convenient polling places for national debates, either. Instead, 
states are the front lines for national debates, the key sites where we work out our 
disagreements before taking them to a national stage. States aren’t pushed aside by 
national politics; instead, they fuel it. 
Heather K. Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1695, 1722 (2017). 
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ERISA floor preemption, is the most elegant and would restore state 
flexibility and remove ERISA’s barriers to state innovation and health reform. 
However, the third solution, ERISA waiver, might be the most politically 
achievable. 
1. Altering ERISA’s Preemption Provisions 
Congress could address these problems by heeding the frequent calls to 
amend ERISA’s regulatory preemption provision, § 1144 (also known as 
§ 514) in a couple of ways. These statutory fixes ultimately are elegant but 
likely not politically feasible in the foreseeable future. 
The first potential amendment would be for Congress to replace ERISA’s 
broad “relates to” express preemption with traditional floor preemption.308 
Floor preemption allows the federal government to establish a national 
standard that displaces less stringent state laws, but it permits more stringent 
state regulation.309 Floor preemption acts as a “one-way ratchet,” preserving 
only those state laws more protective than the federal floor.310 By contrast, 
ERISA’s current express preemption provision displaces “any and all” state 
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans,311 which means all state laws that 
make reference or bear a connection to employer-based health plans are 
preempted, whether or not they conflict with federal requirements.312 
Floor preemption would restore some power-sharing between the state 
and national authorities and would be more consistent with other federal 
health care statutes’ approaches to federalism and preemption.313 It also 
allows a degree of federal uniformity in the setting of the floor, but balances 
 
308 To implement floor preemption in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) could be amended as 
follows: 
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter 
and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they 
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) 
of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take 
effect on January 1, 1975. only to the extent that such State laws actually conflict with 
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III. State laws that impose 
requirements in addition to the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III shall 
not be superseded. 
309 See Buzbee, supra note 297, at 1554 (“Federal floors preclude less stringent state and local 
regulation, but allow for additional and more stringent regulation and typically are accompanied by 
savings clauses and cooperative regulatory structures.”). 
310 Id. at 1566. 
311 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2018). 
312 See Fuse Brown & Sarpatwari, supra note 295, at 6-7. 
313 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1122-23 (discussing the use of conflict 
preemption—a type of floor preemption—elsewhere in amendments to ERISA and in the ACA, 
HIPAA, and other federal statutes). 
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this federal standard with state flexibility, so long as the state laws are 
consistent with and no less protective than the federal floor. Floor 
preemption offers a more desirable solution than broad federal preemption 
because multiple levels of governments bring institutional diversity, more 
opportunities for regulatory reexamination, and can serve as antidotes to 
regulatory stasis or failure.314 In the context of single-payer health care, 
changing ERISA preemption to floor preemption would allow states with the 
political will to reform their health care systems to do so, for other states and 
the federal government to learn from these state experiments, and for 
diversity in policy choices that may better reflect the desires of the people in 
those states. Floor preemption also increases interaction between the federal 
and state governments, which improves policymaking through joint 
regulation, mutual learning, regulatory improvement, and regulatory 
competition.315 
To be sure, there are critics of floor preemption, namely from the business 
community. One critique is that floor preemption sacrifices the uniformity 
and certainty of a single national standard. Broad federal preemption often 
tilts toward deregulation, particularly if the federal law acts as a ceiling—a 
regulatory maximum—rather than as a floor.316 If the national standard serves 
as a floor and not as a ceiling, then it eliminates the possibility that states will 
engage in pro-business deregulatory competition.317 Thus, the alignment 
between business interests and state autonomy318 will fracture if the states are 
only able to innovate in a pro-regulatory direction under the one-way ratchet 
of floor preemption. Of course, the ordinary workings of conflict preemption 
doctrine would still preempt state regulations that contradict federal law in 
ERISA, and our floor preemption proposal could state so explicitly.319 
Second, Congress could amend ERISA’s deemer clause to eliminate its 
applicability to health benefit plans.320 This could be accomplished by simply 
 
314 See Buzbee, supra note 297, at 1576 (suggesting that floor preemption, as an alternative to 
ceiling preemption, utilizes institutional diversity and is less likely to risk dysfunction). 
315 Gerken, supra note 307, at 1720. 
316 See Buzbee, supra note 297, at 1579. 
317 See Michael S. Greve, Business, The States, and Federalism’s Political Economy, 25 HARV. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 895, 903 (2002). 
318 See, e.g., John O. McGinnis & Ilya Somin, Federalism vs. States’ Rights: A Defense of Judicial 
Review in a Federal System, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 89, 107 (2004) (“The jurisdictional competition among 
states fostered by federalism provides state officials the incentive to permit the local autonomy 
necessary to attract businesses and people from other states.”). 
319 See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank, 510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) 
(finding that “traditional preemption analysis” applies even in context of ERISA’s express 
preemption language); supra note 308. 
320 See Bobinski, supra note 134, at 342-43. 
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deleting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), or by adding language to the clause 
stating that it does not protect employers’ self-funded health benefit plans.321 
Either revision would close the deemer clause’s loophole in the savings 
clause, the-exception-within-an-exception that shields self-funded health 
plans from state insurance regulation. Thus all health benefit plans, whether 
self-funded or fully insured, would be subject to state insurance laws that are 
saved by ERISA’s savings clause. The deemer clause, as interpreted by the 
Court, deems self-funded health benefit plans to operate outside the business 
of insurance, and exempts them from state insurance regulations.322 As noted 
above, when Congress wrote ERISA and the deemer clause in 1974, most 
employer-based health plans were fully insured, not self-funded.323 Moreover, 
the text of deemer clause is not a model of clarity and was only interpreted 
to exempt self-funded plans from the state insurance regulation by the Court 
more than a decade after ERISA was passed.324 
Eliminating the deemer clause would not automatically open up employer-
based plans to all state regulation—only to those state laws regulating 
insurance.325 In the context of state single-payer plans, eliminating the deemer 
clause’s distinction between self-funded and fully insured plans would allow the 
nonduplication provision to avoid preemption and could put the 
subrogation/assignment/secondary-payer provisions on surer footing.326 
However, it is less clear whether an employer mandate to participate in the state 
single-payer plan or payroll taxes would be considered health insurance regulation. 
 
321 For example, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) could be revised to read: 
Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is 
not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily 
for the purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a 
plan, shall be deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust 
company, or investment company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or 
banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting to regulate insurance 
companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment companies. 
This provision shall not apply to any “employee welfare benefit plan” established or 
maintained by an employer that provides medical care for participants or their 
dependents directly or through insurance, reimbursement, or otherwise. 
322 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (“[O]ur decision results 
in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving the former open to indirect regulation 
while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give life to a distinction created by Congress in the 
‘deemer clause,’ a distinction Congress . . . has chosen not to alter.”); see also FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 
498 U.S. 52, 61 (1990) (“We read the deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state 
laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of the saving clause.”). 
323 See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
324 See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61; Metro. Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 739-40. 
325 This is because the deemer clause is an exception from the savings clause, which only saves 
state insurance regulation from preemption. See supra subsection II.A.2. 
326 See supra subsections II.B.3–II.B.4. 
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The main drawback of eliminating the deemer clause for health benefit 
plans is the loss of regulatory uniformity, which could increase the costs of 
these plans by exposing self-funded plans to state insurance laws, such as 
benefit mandates (for example, to cover fertility services) and state premium 
taxes.327 This conventional policy argument in favor of broad ERISA 
preemption for self-funded plans is not clearly supported by the empirical 
literature.328 State benefit mandates’ effect on firms’ decisions to self-fund 
their health benefits is mixed,329 and self-funded premiums are not 
necessarily cheaper than premiums for purchased insurance.330 Other factors 
beyond avoiding state regulations also drive employers’ decisions whether to 
self-fund or purchase insurance.331 In short, it is unclear that exposing self-
funded health plans to state insurance laws would increase the costs of these 
plans. Without a deemer clause, employers could still self-fund their health 
plans to take advantage of nonregulatory financial incentives; they would just 
be subject to state health insurance laws. There is no evidence that the 
employers would drop coverage altogether given labor market demands, 
favorable tax-treatment of health benefits, and the ACA’s employer 
mandate.332 Nevertheless, large self-funded firms argue that their costs would 
increase if their health plans were subject to state regulation.333 
A more practical concern is the political difficulty of convincing Congress 
to eliminate the deemer clause’s applicability to self-funded health plans. 
Large, multistate employers would likely oppose any change to ERISA that 
would expose them to additional state regulations. This group’s powerful 
 
327 Roger Feldman, Why Do Employers Self-Insure? New Explanations for the Choice of Self-
Insurance vs. Purchased Health Insurance, 37 GENEVA PAPERS ON RISK & INS. 696, 697 (2012). 
According to industry self-report, the other incentive to self-fund is to retain the “float” of interest 
on funds not paid as premiums to an insurer. Id. 
328 Id. at 697-98, 709-10. 
329 Christina M. Dalton & Sara B. Holland, Why Do Firms Use Insurance to Fund Worker Health 
Benefits? The Role of Corporate Finance, 86 J. RISK & INS. 183, 187 (2019). 
330 Feldman, supra note 327, at 708. 
331 For example, firm size, the ability of employers to engage in risk assessment to negotiate 
fees with third-party administrators and the availability of external capital to fund firm investments 
may contribute to decisions to self-insure. See Dalton & Holland, supra note 329, at 185 (“[W]hen 
firms face costly external finance, they are more likely to purchase insurance. Purchasing insurance 
reduces the risk that health benefit payouts will tie up internal funds and force the firm to raise 
additional outside investment capital.”); Feldman, supra note 327, at 709 (attributing the recent rise 
in self-insurance to employers’ “use of risk assessment to negotiate premiums with self-insured 
health-plan administrators”). 
332 See Long et al., supra note 305 (noting that data from the National Health Interview Survey 
does not indicate that employer coverage is “diminishing in its importance” despite the changes that 
accompanied the ACA). 
333 See Self-Insured Group Health Plans, supra note 211 (observing that employers who self-fund 
do so in part to avoid “conflicting state health insurance regulations/benefit mandates” and “state 
health insurance premium taxes, which are generally 2-3 percent of the premium’s dollar value”). 
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lobby would argue that any alteration to ERISA preemption that subjects 
employers to multiple state regulations would increase their administrative 
burden and stifle private market forces.334 
2. Adding an ERISA Waiver 
Alternatively, Congress could preserve ERISA’s preemption baseline, but 
add a statutory waiver mechanism authorizing the Secretary of Labor to waive 
ERISA preemption provisions for states pursuing health care reforms. A 
statutory waiver would not clear the path for all state reforms; it would lift the 
gate for certain state efforts, based on review and approval by federal agencies. 
And it would complement the waivers in other federal statutes (notably 
Medicaid and the ACA) necessary to fully fund a state single-payer plan.335 
Congress has used statutory waivers with increasing frequency over the 
past few decades to infuse statutory structures with flexibility,336 to mitigate 
the federalism impacts of nationwide rules,337 to encourage supervised state 
experimentation,338 and sometimes to suspend preemption.339 Waivers may 
support state experiments with federal funding, as well as access to the 
nationwide perspective and substantive expertise of federal agencies,340 a 
model frequently employed in federal health care coverage statutes. 
Amending ERISA to add a statutory waiver mechanism for its preemption 
provisions in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 could accomplish all of these goals. 
 
334 See Bagley, supra note 8, at 12 (“[B]ecause of the intensity of the business lobby’s resistance 
to limiting ERISA’s preemptive scope, Congress is very unlikely to amend the law to address 
the concern.”). 
335 See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 8, at 849-50, 863-64, 867 (discussing the operation of these 
existing waiver provisions and noting that “the drafters of public option bills have assumed that one 
or more administrative waivers could be necessary”). 
336 See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 
270, 277-78 (2013) (identifying the phenomenon of “big” waivers that suspend the core tenets of 
federal statutes and explaining their appeal). 
337 See id. at 270; Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education Federalism, 
103 CALIF. L. REV. 565 (2015) (discussing waivers in federal education law). 
338 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1315, 1396n (2018) (Medicaid’s state experimentation waivers); id. 
§ 18052 (ACA’s “State Innovation” waiver); see also Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless 
Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 1, 29 (2013) (discussing the role of waiver in Medicaid); McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, 
supra note 21, at 1127-37 (describing the purposes and effects of the ACA’s State Innovation waiver); 
Sidney D. Watson, Out of the Black Box and Into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers to 
Implement the Affordable Care Act’s Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 213, 
214 (2015) (discussing the role of the “1115 waiver” in Medicaid). 
339 See 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act); id. § 7543(b) (Clean Air 
Act); 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e) (federal transportation code). 
340 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-56. 
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ERISA currently has no waiver provision and arguably delegates no 
waiver authority to the Department of Labor over state regulations.341 
Although ERISA allows the federal agency to coordinate with states on 
enforcing the federal statute,342 ERISA does not expressly delegate the power 
to waive its preemptive effects, as many other statutes have done.343 Absent 
such an express delegation or waiver, an agency’s power to waive preemption 
is hazy at best,344 despite the fact that an agency’s views on the preemptive 
effect of its substantive regulations may merit some deference.345 The statute 
does contain one exemption for Hawaii’s 1974 health reform law, which does 
not operate as a waiver. On June 12, 1974—three months before ERISA was 
enacted346—Hawaii passed a law requiring employers in the state to provide 
health coverage for employees, by either purchasing a state-approved plan or 
funding their own.347 In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt Hawaii’s 
1974 law from the “relates to” preemption provision,348 but narrowed the 
exemption with several corollary provisions.349 No other state has a statutory 
 
341 ERISA does not expressly provide authority for federal agencies to waive statutory 
requirements for states. ERISA does, however, authorize the Secretaries of Labor and Treasury to 
waive certain substantive and administrative requirements for employers, plans, and participants. 29 
U.S.C. § 1023(a)(3)(A), (4)(A) (2018); id. § 1024(a)(2)(A), (a)(3); id. §§ 1082(c)–1084; id. § 1132(c)(10); 
id. § 1132(l)(3); id. § 1202(b); id. § 1202a(a); id. § 1203(a). And the statute expressly saves a few 
specific categories of state laws on insurance and fraud. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144a; id. § 1150; id. 
§ 1191(a)(1), (b)(1)–(2).  
342 29 U.S.C. § 1136(a). 
343 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (2018) (Medical Devices Amendments of 1976); 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) 
(2018) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act); id. § 7543(b) (Clean Air Act); 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e) 
(2018) (federal transportation code). 
344 Cf. Nicholas Bagley, The Labor Department and Liberty Mutual v. Gobeille, THE 
INCIDENTAL ECONOMIST BLOG (Jan. 6, 2016), https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/
the-labor-department-and-liberty-mutual-v-gobeille [https://perma.cc/E73U-VVRH] (arguing that 
Justice Breyer’s suggestion “that the Labor Department should have a say in whether [state] law is 
preempted” is correct and that Justice “Scalia’s concerns about the Labor Department’s authority are 
misplaced”). 
345 See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (“The weight we accord the agency’s 
explanation of state law’s impact on the federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, 
and persuasiveness.” (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234-35 (2001); Skidmore v. 
Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)); Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An 
Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 471-72 (2008) (illustrating that Supreme Court 
decisions on products liability preemption since 1992 have “aligned with the relevant underlying 
federal agency’s take on preemption”). 
346 President Ford signed ERISA into law on September 2, 1974 (Labor Day). Pub. L. No. 93-
406, 88 Stat. 829, 829 (1974). 
347 See Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act §§ -3, -11, -12, 1974 Haw. Sess. Laws 460, 460-61, 464. 
Hawaii employers must pay “at least one-half of the premium” and the employees’ remaining share 
cannot exceed 1.5% of their wages. HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-13 (2018). 
348 See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A). 
349 First, the Hawaii exemption applies only to the original 1974 state law and administrative 
updates to it. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(ii). Second, the Hawaii exemption does not extend to “any 
State tax law relating to employee benefit plans.” Id. § 1144(b)(5)(B)(i). Third, the Hawaii exemption 
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exemption from ERISA. Without a state waiver mechanism, the issue of state 
flexibility mostly gets hashed out in the chaotic and reactive realm of 
preemption litigation.350 
An ERISA preemption waiver could mirror some of the substantial 
flexibility in other federal health care statutes, including Medicare, Medicaid, 
and the ACA, emphasizing the value of state policy innovation by allowing 
states to apply to the federal government for approval to deviate from federal 
standards.351 These waivers delegate to an agency the power to suspend 
certain core statutory rules by approving state applications for waivers.352 To 
receive a waiver, states typically must demonstrate the ways in which their 
proposed variations would further federal goals.353 An ERISA waiver could 
create a process whereby states apply to the Department of Labor for a waiver 
of any or all of § 1144’s preemption provisions to pursue state reforms. To 
focus an ERISA waiver on health reform,354 the provision could specifically 
apply only to state laws impacting employee welfare benefit plans, excluding 
pension plans. Our proposed statutory revision, which the National Council 
of Insurance Legislators has made available on their website, provides an 
example of how to reform ERISA with a waiver.355 
 
states that ERISA reporting requirements and fiduciary responsibilities do supersede the Hawaii 
Act, but notes that the Department of Labor may use its “cooperative arrangements” delegation to 
“assist” Hawaii “in effectuating the policies” of those state provisions still subjected to preemption. 
Id. § 1144(b)(5)(C). 
350 See supra Section II.B; see also McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1153-57 
(considering agencies’ and courts’ comparative competencies to decide whether federal or state law 
should govern a given application). 
351 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (2018) (providing for the ACA’s State Innovation waivers); 
McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-37 (providing an overview of the State 
Innovation waiver’s operation); see also Barron & Rakoff, supra note 336, at 277-78 (describing 
paradigm “big” waivers). 
352 McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-37. 
353 See id. at 1133-37; cf. Christen Linke Young, Note, Pay or Play Programs and ERISA Section 
514: Proposals for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 10 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 197, 235 
(2010) (arguing that “any system of federal agency de-preemption would require statutory criteria 
by which state or local programs could be evaluated”). 
354 And potentially to diminish objections to the amendment based on pension concerns. 
355 Elizabeth Y. McCuskey & Erin Fuse Brown, ERISA Preemption—Health Reform Waiver 
Proposal (Dec. 7, 2018), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/ERISA-1144-Waiver-Proposal-
12.7.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/8VP9-YF3J] [hereinafter Health Reform Waiver Proposal]; Memorandum 
from Elizabeth Y. McCuskey to NCOIL Health, Long Term Care and Health Retirement Issues 
Committee (Dec. 7, 2018), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/McCuskey-memo-to-
NCOIL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FQV-AAU9] (summarizing arguments supporting the addition of a 
statutory waiver to ERISA and explaining features of the Health Waiver Reform Proposal). 
NCOIL adopted a resolution in support of amending ERISA to include a waiver provision on 
March 17, 2019. National Council of Insurance Legislators, Resolution in Support of Amending 
ERISA to Enable State Policymakers to Enact More Meaningful State Healthcare Reform 
(Mar. 17, 2019), http://ncoil.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/ERISA-Resolution-FINAL.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NR3X-2FZ3]; see also Press Release, Nat’l Council of Ins. Regulators, NCOIL 
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From a federalism perspective, an ERISA waiver offers several theoretical 
benefits. Federal baseline regulation with an option for state waivers restores 
some of states’ autonomy and ability to experiment with policy solutions to 
benefit their citizens.356 From an institutional competence perspective, an 
ERISA preemption waiver would shift some of the authority over state health 
reform options from courts to agencies, relying on agencies’ substantive 
expertise rather than courts’ preemption precedents.357 This shift portends 
benefits not only in the availability of state health care reforms, but also in 
the transparency, participation, and federalism dimensions of health care 
regulation.358 Because Congress initiates the statutory waiver, this mechanism 
also has advantages over agency preemption clarifications or rulemaking,359 
namely that it explicitly authorizes the agency action and conclusively 
effectuates the suspension of preemption for approved applications.360 
To maximize these benefits, the statutory waiver should provide for 
coordination between the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health & 
Human Services (HHS) for purposes of both expertise and efficiency. A 
coordination provision would enable Labor to draw on the health insurance 
and market expertise of HHS in determining which waiver applications 
satisfy the substantive criteria.361 And a provision for cross-referencing states’ 
ERISA waiver applications with their ACA, Medicaid, and Medicare waiver 
applications would enable states to pursue all the waivers needed for 
transformative health system changes, while giving the federal agencies a 
comprehensive view of each state’s proposal.362 
 
Passes Resolution to Amend ERISA (Mar. 28, 2019), http://ncoil.org/2019/03/28/ncoil-passes-
resolution-to-amend-erisa [https://perma.cc/AGK3-EM5C] (stating that the Health Reform 
Waiver Proposal “spurred the dialogue that led to [the] Resolution”). 
356 See supra Section III.B. 
357 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1153-56; Meltzer, supra note 110, at 39; 
see generally Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008). 
358 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1162-64. 
359 See, e.g., Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Maintaining Healthy Laboratories of 
Experimentation: Federalism, Health Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 557, 600-04 (2011) 
(arguing for Department of Labor clarification of preemption via guidance or rulemaking). 
360 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1157-62 (detailing the reviewability and 
review process of agency decisions under the ACA’s 1332 waiver provision). Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 
U.S. 555, 576-78 (2009) (refusing deference to agency’s statement about the preemptive intent of its 
authorizing statute and the preemptive effect of its own regulations). 
361 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1155-56. 
362 Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(5) (2018) (providing for combined Medicaid 1115 and ACA 1332 
waiver applications to go to HHS). But see McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1152-53 
(warning about allowing the Medicaid 1115 waiver’s expansive outlook to “bleed over” into 
consideration of the narrower ACA 1332 waiver); Marea B. Tumber, The ACA’s 2017 State Innovation 
Waiver: Is ERISA a Roadblock to Meaningful Healthcare Reform, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 388, 424 (2015) 
(advocating for reform that would “permit states to apply for a specific ERISA waiver”). 
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Of course, the details of legislative drafting will matter enormously, and 
the guardrails imposed on agency discretion to grant or deny state waiver 
applications will determine the ultimate efficacy of any waiver mechanism.363 
As the administration of Medicaid and ACA waivers have illustrated, an 
agency’s discretion in granting waivers may prove exceedingly political and 
threaten the statute’s core infrastructure.364 Yet this may prove less of a 
concern in the context of ERISA preemption waivers because the provision 
being waived—preemption of additional state regulatory efforts—arguably 
threatens only the uniformity of regulation large employers enjoy, and does 
not threaten ERISA’s regulations protecting employee benefits. 
Proposals to add a waiver to ERISA are neither new, nor entirely 
academic. In the early 1990s, as states pursued reforms to deal with rising 
health care costs and growing ranks of uninsured citizens,365 several members 
of Congress introduced proposals for ERISA waivers that would permit 
specific universal coverage reforms in their own states,366 reminiscent of the 
Hawaii exemption Congress had enacted in 1983.367 Others introduced more 
ambitious legislation that would catalyze and fund state universal health care 
efforts, supported by administrative waivers of ERISA.368 When those bills 
stalled, several members of Congress tried to pass two-year ERISA waivers 
for their states’ reforms,369 but those stalled, too.370 After the Clinton 
Administration’s efforts at federal health reform failed in 1994,371 a bipartisan 
group of senators introduced another bill that would fund state reform efforts, 
 
363 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-53; see also, e.g., Health Reform Waiver 
Proposal, supra note 355. 
364 See Rachel Sachs, Medicaid Expansion Through Section 1115 Waivers: Evaluating The Tradeoffs, 
HEALTH AFF.: HEALTH AFF. BLOG (Mar. 15, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/
hblog20160315.053925/full [https://perma.cc/3XDX-SXT2]; see generally McCuskey, Statutory 
Sabotage, supra note 2; Watson, supra note 338. 
365 See generally Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Window Shopping: State Health Reform 
Politics in the 1990s, 20 HEALTH AFF. 50 (2001) (articulating three phases of state health reform 
from 1990 to 2000). 
366 See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 609, 635-44 (1995) (cataloging legislative proposals to waive aspects ERISA for certain 
state experiments—all of which “failed miserably” to pass in 1992-1993). 
367 Act of January 14, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301, 96 Stat. 2605, 2611-12 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A)-(C) (2018)). 
368 E.g., State Care Act of 1992, S. 3180, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Vermont Senator 
Patrick Leahy); State Care: State-Based Comprehensive Care Act of 1992, H.R. 4218, 102d Cong. 
(1992) (introduced by Washington Representative Jim McDermott). See Groves, supra note 366, at 
638-42 (discussing both of these proposed bills). 
369 H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 109-12 (1993). 
370 See Groves, supra note 366, at 643-44. 
371 Jonathan Oberlander, Learning from Failure in Health Reform, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1677, 
1677 (2007); see id. at 1677-79 (describing the failure of the Clinton Health Security Act); Walter A. 
Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH AFF., Spring (I) 1994, 
at 9 (describing the plan before its failure). 
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supported by expansion of the savings clause and specific preemption waivers 
for Hawaii, Oregon, Minnesota, Washington, and Connecticut.372 That bill 
also died in Congress.373 
The Affordable Care Act era has seen some recent revival of ERISA 
waiver legislation, couched in efforts to tweak the ACA’s section 1332 waiver 
process. In 2018, a group of Democratic representatives introduced the State-
Based Universal Health Care Act (SBUHCA), which would, among other 
provisions, add an ERISA preemption waiver within the ACA’s 1332 waiver 
infrastructure.374 The ACA’s existing 1332 waiver provision already permits 
HHS to waive the ACA’s federal employer mandate under certain 
circumstances,375 but the proposed SBUHCA modification would give the 
Department of Labor some authority to suspend ERISA preemption for 
states enacting ACA-replacement legislation.376 Couching the ERISA 
preemption waiver within the ACA 1332 infrastructure would slightly limit 
the scope of the preemption waiver because a state’s application must be part 
of an effort to replace the ACA and the Department of Labor’s grant of any 
such waiver must stay within the guardrails established by the ACA.377 
SBUHCA, too, died in Congress without a vote.378 
Despite these efforts, ERISA preemption stands untouched as an 
obstruction of health care federalism, and an obstacle to state health reform 
efforts—even to those that further the aims of existing federal law. As our 
research illustrates, the post-ACA wave of state single-payer proposals 
interacts with ERISA preemption obstacles in some ingenious ways.379 But 
the indeterminacy of ERISA’s preemption language, the opacity of ERISA 
preemption jurisprudence, and the centrality of employer-based health care 
funding force state legislation to contort and wriggle through exceedingly 
narrow pathways with the expectation of a potential challenge through 
 
372 Health Innovation Partnership Act of 1994, S. 2452, 103d Cong. (1994), reprinted in 140 
CONG. REC. 25,616 (1994); see also Health Innovation Partnership Act of 1994, H.R. 5119, 103d 
Cong. (1994) (the companion House bill to S. 2452); Groves, supra note 366, at 644-48 (discussing 
this proposal). 
373 See H.R. 5119, 103d Cong. (1994); All Actions: H.R. 5119—103rd Congress (1993-1994), 
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/103rd-congress/house-bill/5119/all-actions 
[https://perma.cc/5XJT-KVTB] (showing that the bill has not been enacted). 
374 State-Based Universal Health Care Act of 2018, H.R. 6097, 115th Cong. (2018). 
375 McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1129, 1131-33; see 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2018) 
(enacting the federal employer mandate). 
376 H.R. 6097, 115th Cong. § 2(a) (2018) (proposing § 1332(a)(2)(J)). 
377 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1133-37 (articulating the limitations on 
agency discretion in the ACA 1332 waiver process).   
378 All Actions: H.R. 6097—115th Cong. (2017-2018), CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/
bill/115th-congress/house-bill/6097/all-actions [https://perma.cc/8JET-ZMGW] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
379 See supra Section I.B. 
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litigation.380 An ERISA preemption waiver would alleviate some of the 
pressure of ERISA preemption for promising state experiments, while 
maintaining a federal baseline of preemption.381 
As with any statutory revision, its implementation depends on political 
will.382 Recent Congresses with majorities politically opposed to the ACA 
have shown increased appetite for statutory waiver and state experimentation, 
at least rhetorically.383 But the current administration has granted statutory 
waivers in ways that erode statutory goals, arguably exceeding the delegated 
authority.384 Additionally, the ACA’s imposition of a nationwide employer 
mandate and other insurance-related requirements draw from some of the 
baseline arguments about ERISA’s deregulatory “uniformity” function for 
the majority of fully insured plans.385 And the ACA’s creation of opportunities 
for pass-through funding and other statutory waivers for states signals that 
waivers and state experimentation are core features of ongoing reform 
efforts.386 Amending ERISA with a statutory waiver for preemption seems 
even more urgent and more feasible at this moment in health reform. 
3. Shoring up ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence 
Even without congressional intervention, courts could strike a better 
balance between federalism and national uniformity in ERISA preemption 
by restoring some gestalt principles of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. As 
described in Part II, courts could more precisely apply the Supreme Court’s 
ERISA precedent from Travelers387 by limiting “relates to” preemption only 
for those state statutes that eliminate all meaningful choice of health benefits 
 
380 See supra Section II.B. 
381 Note that we have not proposed the case-by-case statutory exemptions granted to Hawaii 
and sought by Massachusetts and other states in the early 1990s. Cf. Sidney D. Watson et al., The 
Road from Massachusetts to Missouri: What Will It Take for Other States to Replicate Massachusetts Health 
Reform?, 55 KAN. L. REV. 1331 (2007). 
382 Cf. Linke Young, supra note 353, at 221 (arguing that debate of the ACA in 2010 offered an 
opportunity and “legislative vehicle” for altering ERISA). 
383 McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1139-40, 1164-67; McCuskey, Statutory 
Sabotage, supra note 2, at 233-36; cf. Exec. Order No. 13,765, 82 Fed. Reg. 8351  
(Jan. 24, 2017) (emphasizing state flexibility and instructing HHS to exercise its waiver authority 
“[t]o the maximum extent permitted” by law). 
384 See Huberfeld, supra note 288, at 788-91; Sidney D. Watson, Medicaid, Work, and the Courts: 
Reigning in HHS Overreach, 46 J.L. MED. & ETHICS, 887, 888-89 (2019). 
385 See, e.g., N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
U.S. 645, 657 (1995) (“The basic thrust of the pre-emption clause, then, was to avoid a multiplicity 
of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”); 
Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 191 (4th Cir. 2007) (emphasizing uniformity); 
McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1144-45 (describing how the ACA filled some of the 
regulatory void ERISA had created). 
386 See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1101-08. 
387 514 U.S. 645 (1995). 
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for employers,388 rather than extending preemption to state laws that merely 
make one choice less economically desirable than another.389 
And courts could return to some jurisprudential principles which militate 
in favor of state regulation, namely the presumption against preemption and 
the broader intent behind the ERISA statute. Supreme Court ERISA 
jurisprudence since Travelers has framed preemption analysis with the 
longstanding presumption against preemption, which the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged applies with even greater force to regulation in historical 
spheres of state authority, such as insurance and health care.390 While the 
presumption against preemption does not itself save state laws,391 it should 
favor preservation of historical state authority—such as regulation of 
insurance, health care providers, and raising general revenue—in close 
cases.392 Self-funded plans, however, remain nearly unreachable by state laws 
under existing interpretations of deemer and savings clauses, despite the 
presumption against preemption.393 
On a more fundamental level, courts could interpret ERISA’s preemption 
provisions with greater fidelity to the statute’s context and history, which 
suggest that employee benefit protection and the preservation of state 
insurance laws ought to feature more prominently than the current obsession 
with uniformity. Congress’s primary concern in enacting ERISA was 
“promot[ing] the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee 
benefit plans.”394 To gain support from large employers toward that broader 
goal, ERISA included the employer-friendly preemption clause designed “to 
permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.”395 
The inclusion of the savings clause, however, explicitly contemplated a 
regulatory regime embracing state-by-state “disuniformities” in the law of 
 
388 E.g., Fielder, 475 F.3d at 193. 
389 See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 546 F.3d 639, 660-61 
(9th Cir. 2008). 
390 See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 654-55; see also, e.g., De Buono v. NYSA—ILA Med. & Clinical 
Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 813-14 (1997). 
391 See, e.g., Fielder, 475 F.3d at 191 (holding a state law preempted, but “recognizing that ERISA 
is not presumed to supplant state law, especially in cases involving ‘fields of traditional state 
regulation,’ which include ‘the regulation of matters of health and safety’” (quoting De Buono, 520 
U.S. at 814 n.8)). 
392 See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 108-112; see also, e.g., Golden Gate, 
546 F.3d at 647-48 (reviewing the operation of this historical presumption in the field of health 
care regulation). 
393 See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61-63 (1990). 
394 Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 90 (1983); see 29 U.S.C. § 1001(c) (2018); see also 
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107, 115 (1989) (identifying the “mismanagement of funds 
accumulated to finance employee benefits and the failure to pay employees beenfits from 
accumulated funds” as ERISA’s “primary concern”); 120 CONG. REC. 29,193 (1974) (statement of 
Sen. Biaggi) (describing ERISA as “an emancipation proclamation” for employees). 
395 Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657; see Wooten, supra note 102. 
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health insurance.396 Courts analyzing preemption often focus on the goal of 
employer-friendly uniformity and neglect both the savings clause and the 
statute’s broader employee-protection goal.397 Courts would do well to 
recognize the import of ERISA’s savings clause and the statute’s broader 
employee-protection goal, as measured against the bounded uniformity in the 
concession to employers. 
In the end, we see little reason to expect that courts can fix the dysfunction 
they have added to a dysfunctional statutory provision. While these 
jurisprudential adjustments might help clear some way for state single-payer 
reforms without legislative intervention, they lack the clarity and 
predictability that statutory revisions can offer.398 Most of the necessary 
jurisprudential adjustments would need to come from new Supreme Court 
opinions,399 which is an unlikely prospect. And jurisprudential changes deal 
only with the symptoms of ERISA’s obstructionism, not the root cause: the 
statute’s wording, which courts so frequently have lamented and called on 
Congress to revise,400 as we do now. 
 
396 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985); see also Self-Ins. Inst. of 
Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 555 (6th Cir. 2016) (“ERISA, in other words, does not ‘create a 
state–law–free zone around everything that affects an ERISA plan.’” (quoting Associated Builders 
& Contractors v. Mich. Dep’t of Labor & Econ. Growth, 543 F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 2008))). 
397 Compare Travelers, 514 U.S. at 657 (emphasizing uniformity), FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 60 
(“To require plan providers to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations 
would complicate the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers 
might offset with decreased benefits.”), and Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 
191 (2007) (describing uniformity and minimizing administrative burden as ERISA’s “primary 
objective[s]”), with Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 56 (D. Mass. 1997) 
(lamenting that “in the health insurance context, ERISA has evolved into a shield of immunity 
which thwarts the legitimate claims of the very people it was designed to protect”), and Self-Ins. 
Inst., 827 F.3d at 555 (contesting the notion that ERISA could fully shield ERISA-regulated plans 
from state regulation, “particularly in areas of traditional state concern” like “a state tax and its 
ancillary requirements”). 
398 See Sharpe, supra note 111, at 230 (noting, in the context of a different statutory scheme, the 
“complex interplay between statutory interpretation and federalism default rules that largely drives 
the Supreme Court’s preemption decisions”). 
399 Cf. Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141, 152-53 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring) (lamenting that 
Supreme Court precedents provide no clear guidance and recommending a return to “ordinary pre-
emption jurisprudence” instead of ERISA exceptionalism). 
400 For example, Judge Young observed in Andrews-Clarke: 
This case, thus, becomes yet another illustration of the glaring need for Congress to 
amend ERISA to account for the changing realities of the modern health care system. 
Enacted to safeguard the interests of employees and their beneficiaries, ERISA has 
evolved into a shield of immunity that protects health insurers, utilization review 
providers, and other managed care entities from potential liability for the 
consequences of their wrongful denial of health benefits. 
984 F. Supp. at 53. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Affordable Care Act has catalyzed a new era of health reform 
momentum in state and local governments, as evidenced by the voluminous 
and robust state single-payer legislation catalogued here. While states may 
successfully contort their health reform efforts to avoid ERISA preemption, 
they should not have to do so any longer. ERISA preemption has outlived its 
utility as applied to health insurance and has elevated the preferences of 
private businesses above the interests of sovereign states in ways that subvert 
federalism. The time has come to remove ERISA’s obstructions and to unlock 
states’ capacities as laboratories of health reform. 
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APPENDIX A: STATE SINGLE-PAYER PROPOSALS, 2010–2019401 
  State   Proposal Date A B C Plan Type 
1. CA SB 562 05/2017   •   B 
  CA SB 810 01/2012 •     A 
2. DE HB 74 04/2013 •     A 
  DE HB 392 06/2012 •     A 
3. FL SB 1486 03/2019   •   B 
  FL SB 1872 01/2018   •   B 
4. HI HB 1286 01/2019       ― 
  HI SB 2207 01/2018       ― 
5. IA HF 96 01/2019 • •   A B 
  IA HF 2352 02/2018 • •   A B 
6. IL HB 207 01/2019 • •   A B 
  IL HF 2436 02/2017 • •   A B 
  IL SB 2177 10/2015 • •   A B 
  IL HB 942 01/2013 • •   A B 
  IL HB 311 01/2011 • •   A B 
7. MA HB 2987 01/2017 • •   A B 
  MA HB 1026 01/2015 • •   A B 
  MA SB 515 01/2013 • •   A B 
  MA SB 501 01/2011 • •   A B 
8. MD HB 1087 02/2019 • •   A B 
  MD HB 1516 02/2018   •   B 
  MD SB 667 01/2014       ― 
9. ME HP 316 01/2019     • C 
  ME HP 887 04/2017     • C 
  ME HP 962 04/2013   • • B C 
  ME HP 1026 04/2011 • • • A B C 
10. MI HB 6285 08/2018     • C 
11. MN SF 1125 01/2019 •   • A C 
  MN SF 219 01/2017 •   • A C 
  MN SF 2163 05/2015 •   • A C 
  MN SF 912 02/2013 •   • A C 
  MN SF 8 01/2011 •   • A C 
  
 
401 Legend: A = Funding Plan; B = Provider Restriction; C = Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary-
Payer Provision. 
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  State   Proposal Date A B C Plan Type 
12. NH HB 697 02/2019       ― 
  NH HB 1793 01/2018       ― 
  NH HB 686 01/2015       ― 
13. NJ SB 2598 05/2018       ― 
  NJ AB 5310 12/2017       ― 
  NJ AB 4945 06/2017 • •   A B 
14. NY AB 5248 02/2019 • •   A B 
  NY SB 4840 02/2018 • •   A B 
  NY AB 5062 04/2016 • •   A B 
  NY AB 5389 04/2013 • •   A B 
  NY AB 7860 05/2011 •     A 
15. OH HB 292 06/2019 • • • A B C 
  OH HB 440 12/2017 • • • A B C 
  OH SB 137 04/2015 • • • A B C 
  OH SB 104 04/2013 • • • A B C 
  OH HB 287 06/2011   • • B C 
16. OR SB 631 02/2015     • C 
17. PA SB 1014 02/2018 •   • A C 
  PA HB 1688 11/2015 •   • A C 
  PA SB 400 01/2013 •   • A C 
  PA HB 2551 07/2012 •   • A C 
18. RI HB 5611 02/2019 • • • A B C 
  RI SB 2237 02/2018 • • • A B C 
  RI SB 2824 03/2016 • •   A B 
19. SC SB 786 05/2015 • •   A B 
20. VT HB 202 05/2011 •   • A C 
  VT HB 80 01/2011   •   B 
21. WA SB 5222 02/2019     • C 
  WA HB 1104 01/2019 •   • A C 
  WA SB 5957 06/2017   •   B 
  WA SB 5747 02/2017 •     A 
  WA SB 5741 01/2015 •     A 
  WA SB 5609 02/2013 •     A 
  WA SB 5224 01/2013 •     A 
   Proposals A B C Any 
Total No. 66 45 34 25 58 
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APPENDIX B: SEARCH METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY  
STATE SINGLE-PAYER BILLS 
State single-payer bills were identified through multiple searches, 
conducted between June 2018 and September 2019, of four Westlaw databases: 
(1) proposed legislation; (2) enacted legislation; (3) historical proposed 
legislation; and (4) historical enacted legislation. The first two contain bills 
and sessions laws, respectively, from states’ current or most recent legislative 
sessions, whatever those dates may be. The second two contain materials from 
prior sessions going back to 2005 or before. 
Within each database two sets of search terms were used: << advanced: 
(single-pay*r OR (universal +7 (access OR coverage)) /p health-care) & 
DA(aft 03-24-2010) >> and << advanced: (all /5 (residents +7 eligib!) AND 
health) & DA(aft 03-23-2010) >>. After the initial search in June 2018, the 
“date after” term was updated to the date of the prior search, to capture new 
bills on a rolling basis over the study period. 
Applying the search terms to the four state legislative databases in June 
2018 yielded 572 results. Because the databases are continually updated with 
recent legislation, repeating the search today using the initial search strings 
will return a different number of results. 
From the set of results, we first removed duplicate entries that were found 
by both sets of search terms. Then, we removed duplicate bills that either 
were given different designations as they moved through the legislative 
process (but that were otherwise identical), or substantially similar bills 
introduced in different chambers in the same state legislative session. Next, 
using metadata, abstracts, and longer textual reviews where necessary, we 
then excluded those bills captured by our search terms that did not purport 
to be a single-payer plan. The most common alternative purposes of such bills 
were to (1) call for a study, commission, or some other clearly prefatory 
inquiry into the form or feasibility of a single-payer plan; (2) propose a health 
care reform initiative where the sponsors explicitly disavowed an intention to 
create a single-payer system; (3) call for the state legislature to support some 
proposed national single-payer effort; (4) attempt to thwart national reform 
efforts, which were often characterized as a “first step” toward a single-payer 
system; (5) attempt a less-than-comprehensive health system reform or to 
effect universal access to some specific service (e.g., HIV prevention, primary 
care, mental health services); or (6) establish exchanges or otherwise 
implement aspects of the ACA, such as those designating a single state agency 
for the coordination of care. 
The above search, removal, and exclusion steps were performed each time 
a search was conducted during the study period. 
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After exclusions, sixty-six proposals remained and were analyzed for their 
provisions to capture employer health expenditures and/or move individuals 
with employer-based coverage into the single-payer plan. While 
comprehensive, this set is not necessarily a census of all unique legislative 
proposals during this period. Some bills may have been missed during the 
initial search and others erroneously removed during the subsequent 
exclusion process. 
